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The legal concepts Inherent in the area of account­
ants’ civil liability have evolved over a period of many 
years. The English Courts contributed the basis of this 
evolutionary process by delineating a set of legal doc­
trines which, if necessary, could have been applied to 
cases of accountant-third party litigation. The American 
Courts later gave impetus to the development of this body 
of law by interpreting and specifically applying the 
early legal doctrines. Yet, the most significant step in 
the developmental process was the result of the New York 
Court’s attempt to balance legal equity with social need. 
This judicial balancing process produced a doctrine of 
accountants’ civil liability which has severely limited 
the ability of third parties to recover pecuniary losses 
from public accountants.
Today, the American Courts are continuing in their 
attempts to balance legal equity with social need. Yet, 
in attempting to accomplish this task, the individual 
courts have created two significant legal problems for 
the public accounting profession. First, the attempts of 
the individual courts to implement this balancing process 
have resulted in a series of decisions which have produced
iv
a significant gap between legal and professional inter­
pretations of the public accountant's audit responsibili­
ties. Second, the attempts of the individual courts to 
implement this balancing process have resulted in the 
promulgation of at least six distinct concepts of liability 
placement. These two problems have forced members of 
the accounting profession to assume a defensive posture, 
and therefore, have significantly hampered the profession's 
attempts to keep pace with the growing information needs 
of economic society.
An analysis of the reasoning and facts underlying 
this judicial balancing process produces two significant 
results. First, such an analysis reveals that there are 
significant legal reasons for extending the third party 
liability of public accountants. Second, such an analysis 
reveals that such an extension of the public accountant's 
third party liability will not have detrimental effects 
on either the accounting profession or economic society. 
Thus, an analysis of facts and reasoning inevitably results 
in the conclusion that the liability of public accountants 
to third party financial statement users should be extended.
To implement this conclusion, and to provide a 
basis for solving the problems which confront public 
accounting, a five step approach was presented. First, 
it was proposed that the public accounting profession 
should be allowed to establish the standards of conduct by
v
which its members will be judged. Second, it was proposed 
that the courts continue to use the concept of the reason­
able man as a means of comparing the activities of 
individual accountants with those which would have been 
required by professional standards. Third, it was pro­
posed that the courts refuse to recognize the legal va­
lidity of overly broad disclaimers or qualifications of 
opinions. Fourth, it was proposed that the courts con­
tinue to hold accountants liable to third parties in cases 
of pure fraud. Finally, it was proposed that the courts 
hold public accountants liable to all reasonably foresee­
able third parties when the accountant is guilty of any 
form of negligence. Such a five part doctrine of account­
ants' liability will introduce both certainty and equity 




The issue of accountants’ legal liability to 
financial statement users has been one of significance 
for both the accounting and legal professions. The 
constantly evolving relationship which exists between 
certified public accountants and the users of the finan­
cial statements that they examine has been one of the most 
volatile elements of the auditing environment.
In the early part of this century, this legal 
relationship was one which was limited to the individual 
client and a chosen accountant (i.e., the accountant- 
statement user relationship was totally contractual). 
Management hired the public accountant as only one more in 
the series of controls designed to assure the proper func­
tioning of the employees of the firm. The primacy of this 
accountant-client relationship was so significant in 1931 > 
that Justice Cardozo was led to say, ”. . .  public 
accountants are public only in the sense that their 
services are offered to anyone who chooses to employ 
them.
■'-Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven and 
Company, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
1
The relationship between the accountant and third 
party statement user was not given significant considera­
tion until 1930. Soon after the securities frauds 
of the late twenties and early thirties were revealed, 
the economic sector realized that this "secondary" rela­
tionship was one of extreme importance. At this point, 
even Congress recognized that without independent profes­
sional assistance issuers of securities could not be relied 
upon to provide adequate information for purposes of in­
vestment, The ' : Congress sought to institutionalize
certain professionals as the public’s first line of defense 
through the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 The certified public 
accountant was to become a major component of that line of 
defense.
Since the passage of the Securities Acts, the 
relationship existent between the public accountant and 
third party investors has become steadily more important.
The continued growth and expansion of industry, the grow­
ing complexity of business relations and the increasing 
specialization of business functions have all forced the 
investor to rely upon the representations of accounting 
specialists.  ̂ As recently as 1958, there were only nine
^Theodore Sonde, "The Responsibility of Profes­
sionals Under Federal Securities Laws— Some Observations," 
Northwestern University Law Review 60 (March-April, 1973)*2.
^Texas Tunneling Company v. City of Chattanooga,
204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1964), rev’d 329 F. 2d 402 
(6th Cir. 1964).
3
million Americans involved in stock investments. By 1968, 
that figure had increased to more than twenty-four mil­
lion. ** The 1970*s have seen a continued growth of indi­
vidual involvement in stock transactions. Recent estimates 
indicate that nearly thirty-one million persons are 
involved in some form of stock investments.5 These figures 
only serve to exemplify the fact that the number of indi­
viduals affected by the accountant’s opinion has increased 
greatly.
The extent of the necessary relationship between 
the accountant and third parties has grown throughout 
this century. Today, the third party investor is the 
primary user of the financial statements examined by the 
certified public accountant. If not for the requirements 
of the third party statement user there would be little or 
no need for the protection provided by the services of the 
independent auditor.^
Yet, this increase in the reliance placed on the 
auditor’s examination has brought with it problems for the 
public accountant. As the third party statement user 
became a more significant consideration for the auditor,
** Arthur M. Louis, "The Accountants are Changing 
the Rules," Fortune 127 (June 15, 1968):177.
^Paul LeBlanc, "Accounting as a Consumer Protector," 
Business Lawyer 27 (November, 1971):76.
^Nicholas D. Tellie, "Auditor’s Liability to Third 
Parties," Loyola Law Review 17 (1970-1971):358.
legal suits, based on the negligence of some accountants, 
and instigated by third party investors, became a more 
significant problem for the public accounting profession 
as a whole.7
Any attempt to determine the exact number of cases 
presently involving public accountants and third party 
statement users would necessitate an examination of the 
dockets of all civil courts in this country. Such a survey
would be highly impractical for two reasons. First, if the
1
data obtained— the number of presently pending cases— were 
viewed in relation to the effort expended, the results 
would seem highly counterproductive. The actual value 
of the data to be obtained by such a study is somewhat 
questionable. Second, the results obtained in such studies 
would be highly questionable as a quantification of the 
accountant-third party legal relationship. For one reason 
or another, many suits which would be instigated by a 
third party are settled out of court.8 Thus, an attempt 
to quantify the number of presently pending cases would 
fail to include all those cases which never reach the 
courtroom. Nevertheless, several authors have undertaken
7Ibid., pp. 357-358.
g
Edward J. Daus, "Accountants' Liability Today,"
New York Certified Public Accountant 37 (November, 1967): 
835. An example of this situation is provided by the Mills 
Factor Corporation which collapsed in 1968. Lybrand, Ross, 
Montgomery reportedly settled this potential suit out of 
court for an estimated $4.95 million. Robert D. Hershey, 
Jr., "Lawyer Assails Attack on CPA's," New York Times,
1 May 1971, p. 41.
partial studies of the significance of this problem.
These studies, in general, produce two conclusions.
First, most of the limited surveys indicate that the 
actual number of cases, and the pecuniary damages involved, 
are significant. A survey conducted over the 1966-1967 
period concluded that there were between eighty and one 
hundred cases pending involving damages of no less than 
twenty million dollars.9 a later survey which was specifi­
cally limited to the firm of Peat, Marwick and Mitchell 
found that firm to be involved in twenty-eight suits with 
damage claims of approximately twenty million dollars.10
A second general conclusion reached by most 
studies is that the degree of accountant-statement user 
legal Involvement is increasing. One general study 
produced the conclusion that there were as many lawsuits 
brought against accountants in the 1967-1968 period as in 
the twelve immediately preceding years.11 This conclusion 
is backed by a study of a specific underwriting firm 
which was involved in only forty-four eases in 1964. By 
1968, this figure had grown to seventy-seven, and by 1969, 
it had reached eighty-three.
^Daus, pp. 835-836.
10Lee Berton, "CPAs Under Fire: Auditors' Critics
Seek Wider, Faster Action In Reform of Practices," Wall 
Street Journal, 15 November 1966, p. 13.
11Louis.
12Harry R. Weyrich, "Exposure to Professional 
Liability," New York Certified Public Accountant 40 (July, 
1970):56l.
This increase in the number of legal actions 
involving public accountants would seem to be definitely 
related to two major factors. First, there has been a 
considerable increase in the reliance of third parties on 
the financial statements prepared by certified public 
accountants. Second, there has been a considerable 
liberalization of the courts' attitude toward the use of 
class actions by financial statement u s e r s . 13 While the 
relationship between these factors and increased litigation 
seems obvious, the actual legal situation in which the 
accountant is involved is not quite so evident. A discus­
sion of the theoretical problems underlying the accountant- 
third party legal situation follows.
Statement of Problem 
With regard to his potential liability to third 
party financial statement users, the public accountant is 
faced with two problems of major legal significance. First, 
when considering the service areas from which third party 
liability may arise, the accountant is presented with a 
situation which is shrouded by a great deal of judicial 
uncertainty. Second, and probably more important, when 
attempting to determine the conditions under which third 
party recovery will be granted by the courts, the account­
ant is forced to analyze a number of legal precedents
13r . James Gormley, "Accountants' Professional 
Liability— A Ten Year Review," Business Lawyer 29 (July, 
197^):1214.
which contribute to an almost incomprehensible maze of 
judicial theory. A basic discussion of these two problems 
follows.
The Judicial Interpretation of 
Professional Responsibilities
Traditionally, the audit services performed by the 
public accountant, the financial statements examined in 
the course of those services and the opinion expressed on 
the fairness of those financial statements were the primary 
links between the accountant and third party financial 
statement users. The investor, in most cases, is forced 
to rely upon the audit report in making his investment 
decisions.12* The failures of the accountant in preparing 
this report were initially the greatest source of both 
potential harm for the third party statement user, and 
potential legal responsibility for the public accountant. 
While the audit services, as defined by professional 
standards, would seem to be the logical basis of all legal 
responsibility, recent court decisions have broadened the 
scope of the accountant's legal involvement.
Some recent judicial attent5.cn has centered on the 
issue of the auditor's responsibilities in dealing with 
information obtained subsequent to the performance of the 
actual audit services. Prior to 1967 > there had been 
little or no attention given to this subject area, but at 
that time, the significance of the issue was realized.
l2*Daus, p. 835*
Since this realization, the courts have recognized that 
when the accountant has reason to believe that statement 
users are relying on an audit report which is untrue, that 
accountant has a legal obligation to correct that r e p o r t . 15 
Thus, even if the accountant feels that his audit report 
was correct at the date of issuance, the negation of this 
belief by subsequently acquired information imposes upon 
him an obligation to disclose that information to the third 
party statement user.
Accountants' legal liability for the detection of 
corporate fraud has provided the courts another opportunity 
for comment. While the accounting profession has always 
argued that accountants cannot be expected to detect 
fraudulent activity on the part of corporate i n s i d e r s , ^  
the courts have shown a tendency toward imputing more 
exacting standards to the activities of public accountants. 
As the courts have begun to apply these more exacting 
standards, they have also begun to hold the accountant to a 
level of legal responsibility concomitant with these new 
requirements. Thus, accountants have recently been held 
liable to third party statement users for failing to detect 
the existence of fraud. ^
15See Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 
1967); and Sonde, pp. 17-18.
^American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
Statement on Auditing Standards (New York: American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1973)» PP* 2-3-
17Hochfelder v. Ernst and Ernst, 503 F. 2d 1100 (7th 
Cir. 197*0 •
The preparation of unaudited financial statements 
has created a third new area of legal concern for the 
certified public accountant. Traditionally, it was assumed 
that the standards of the accounting profession would 
guide the courts in the placement of liability. It 
followed from that assumption that accountants had no legal 
responsibility when dealing with unaudited write-up work, 
since the accounting profession did not require any tech­
niques of verification to be applied to the preparation of 
such statements. This feeling of total insulation from 
third party suits was soon to be destroyed.
In 1136 Tenants Corporation v. Max Rothenberg and 
C o m p a n y (1136 Tenants) the court held that under 
recently espoused concepts of negligence liability, an 
accountant may be held responsible for injury suffered 
by third parties due to the use of unaudited financial 
statements. Courts have reasoned that if accountants, for 
any reason, fail to detect fraud which has occurred in the 
business activity of the firm, an innocent third party may 
be unnecessarily harmed. This reasoning led the court in 
1136 Tenants to conclude that, if certain other conditions 
are met, the fact that financial statements are unaudited
1 fi1136 Tenants Corporation v. Max Rothenberg and 
Company, 319 N.Y.S. 2d 1007 (1971).
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does not bar a third party from seeking recovery from the 
public accountant.^9
As the financial world becomes more complex, and 
investors become more sophisticated, the demand for infor­
mation concerning the financial position of the firm 
becomes greater. Ultimately, potential investors will 
demand information concerning the current value of a
firm's assets,20 and forecasts of the firm’s future finan-
21cial position. If the trends of the past hold true, 
there will be a need for independent verification of 
these new pieces of information to protect the public from 
unfair manipulation. The public accountant will probably 
provide a major source of this independent verification.
If at the same time, current legal trends hold true, the 
areas of forecasted and current value financial statements 
may soon represent a major part of the legal problems of 
the certified public accountant.
When the accountant was held legally responsible 
for his actions in the performance of audit services, there
-^j. Michael Murphy, "Notes and Comments: Accounts
and Accounting: The Responsibilities of CPA's Imposed by
Law and by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants," Oklahoma Law Review 26 (August, 1973):385- 388.
20Harold J. Trlenens and Daniel U. Smith, "Legal 
Implications of Current Value Accounting," Financial 
Executive 40 (September, 197*0 :**6.
21John C. Burton, "An Educator Views the Public 
Accounting Profession," Journal of Accountancy 122 
(September, 1971):51*
11
existed a great deal of agreement between the standards 
set for him by the courts and those established by his 
profession. As the judiciary became more liberal, by 
Imposing liability for services beyond the performance of 
the traditional audit function, a gap appeared between the 
legal and professional standards established for public 
accountants. This gap creates a great deal of confusion 
as to the professional responsibilities of the accountant, 
and thus, contributes to a severe judgemental problem.
The Judicial Interpretation of 
Liability Placement
Even if the public accountant is capable of 
determining which of his specific undertakings are to be 
subject to judicial review, the accountant is faced with 
a second, and possibly more significant, problem. At 
present, there is no substantial body of law available 
to deal with the conditions governing the legal boundaries 
of the accountant-third party relationship. While there 
have been many decisions advanced over the past one hundred 
years, there has been almost no agreement as to a single 
concept of liability placement.22 There are many rudimen­
tary concepts, but when these are integrated into the 
system of civil law, constantly changing doctrines of 
accountants* liability are obtained. At this time, there 
exist no less than six major concepts of liability place­
ment which are potentially applicable to cases of
22Daus, p. 836.
12
accountant-third party litigation, A brief outline of 
these concepts, and their relation to the problem of 
accountants' third party responsibility, follows.
The earliest, and most universally accepted, legal 
concept which has been applied to the area of accountants' 
liability to third party statement users is that of 
liability for fraudulent misrepresentation. As early as 
1889, the English Courts, in the case of Derry v. Peek23 
(Derry), recognized the existence of an action based in 
deceit. Such an action allowed an injured, yet innocent, 
third party a means of recovery when a fraud was perpe-
phtrated against him. n Yet, the Derry Court made it very
clear that the fact that the defendant misrepresented
his position was not in itself sufficient grounds to
25justify recovery. Beyond the basic misrepresentation,
it must be shown that the defendant intended to deceive,
Pand thus, inflict harm upon the third party.
The American Courts were quick to establish the 
basic distinction pointed out in Derry. The courts
23Derry v. Peek, 14 A.C. 337 (1889).
P 2l“̂ Richard C. Rastetter, Jr., "Torts— Accountants are 
Liable to Third Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation 
when Both the Nature of the Transaction and the Group to 
Which the Third Party Belongs are Known to the Accountant," 
Drake Law Review 20 (January, 1971):412.
25 ̂Derry.
PfiWilliam L. Prosser, "Misrepresentation and Third 
Parties," Vanderbilt Law Review 19 (March, 1966):233.
13
immediately distinguished between fraudulent and negligent 
misrepresentation, and thus, barred recovery in the latter 
of the two situations. jt is the concept of fraudulent 
misrepresentation— inclusive of its required element of 
intent— which has been universally applied by the American 
Courts to the area of accountants' third party liability. 
Unfortunately for the public accountant, when the courts 
attempt to define the liability of accountants in situations 
which involve something less than pure fraud, the doctrines 
of liability placement are less than universally accepted, 
and often, become confused and incomprehensible.
If the public accountant is guilty of only 
negligence in the performance of his services (i.e., if 
he does not intend to deceive the third party statement 
user) a twofold legal problem develops. First, the 
judicial system must determine the degree to which the 
accountant was negligent. Second, the system must deter­
mine the type of relationship which existed between the 
accountant an the third party statement user. These two 
factors, and the interpretations of them used by particular 
courts, contribute greatly to an already perplexing 
situation.
One of the two major types of negligence which may 
be committed by the accountant is termed "gross negligence". 
In rendering its decision, the Derry Court made a major
2?See Rastetter, p. 412; and Landell v. Lybrand, 264 
Pa. 4o6, 197 A. 783 (1919).
distinction between this type of misrepresentation and 
ordinary negligence. The court argued that pure fraud 
required an element of direct intent on the part of the 
defendant; yet, certain unintended actions could constitute 
gross negligence, and thus, be used an an inference of 
fraud on the part of the defendant. If an individual 
makes a statement which he knows will be relied upon by 
others, there exists an obligation to exercise care in 
the making of that statement. If the statement is made 
recklessly, or without care as to its truth or falsity; 
if the maker of the statement has no reasonable grounds 
for believing that statement to be true, he will be held 
liable to the third party for his gross negligence as if 
he had been guilty of pure fraud.2® This concept of 
gross negligence as the equivalent of fraudulent misrep­
resentation was later to be institutionalized by the New 
York Court as a viable cause of action against public 
accountants.2  ̂ Yet, different courts have attached 
different meanings to the term gross negligence, thus 
further contributing to the problems inherent in the area 
of accountants’ legal liability.
When the courts determine that the public account­
ant is not guilty of gross negligence, the issue of lia­
bility is still far from concluded. Over the years, four
p Q*°Derry.
2^See Rastetter, p. 413; and Ultramares; and State 
Street Trust Company v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E. 2d 
416 (1938).
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doctrines of liability placement in cases of "simple or 
ordinary negligence" have evolved. Each of these four 
legal doctrines is inherently dependent upon the relation­
ship which exists between the accountant and third party.
An outline of each of the potentially applicable doctrines 
follows.
In many early decisions— none of which involved 
accountants— the general rule was established that privity 
of contract (the existence of a contractual relationship) 
was a necessary element of any legal action based on 
simple negligence in the performance of a contract.3° By 
1931, the year of the New York Court’s first ruling on the 
issue of accountants’ third party liability, the concept 
of privity as a prerequisite to recovery had diminished 
greatly in terms of its legal significance. This decline 
in the importance of the privity doctrine was summarized 
quite well by Justice Cardozo when he said, " . . .  the 
assault upon the citadel of privity is proceding in these 
days apace."31 Yet, it was in that very case that Cardozo 
reinstated the concept of privity of contract as a major 
legal doctrine. In his first comment on the issue, Cardozo 
imposed privity as a legal barrier between an injured third 
party statement user and a negligent accountant.32
3°Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918).
3^Ultramares.
32pro sser, p. 231.
While Cardozo asserted the lack of privity of 
contract between the plaintiff and defendant as the 
Court's reason for prohibiting the recovery of pecuniary 
losses, most analysts feel that there was a further factor 
motivating the court's decision. The court recognized 
that the services of public accountants were a social 
necessity; furthermore, the court believed that the exten­
sion of liability to third parties in cases of simple 
negligence would create liability of such a great amount 
as to potentially ruin the accounting profession. This 
fear of the extension of potentially ruinous liability 
in cases of ordinary negligence would seem to be the true 
reason for the direction of the New York Court's initial
decision.33
No matter what reason is accepted as the basic fac­
tor in the New York Court's decision, the lack of privity 
of contract was established as a barrier between third 
parties and negligent accountants. This concept of 
liability placement remained relatively unscathed until 
the i960's.3^ At that time, a reanalysis of prior dicta 
produced some attempts at modifying the New York Rule.
As early as 1922, the New York Court recognized 
that the privity concept was not an all encompassing legal
33Rozny v. Marnul, 43 111. 2d 54, 250 N.E. 656 
(1969).
3^Richard L. Miller, "Public Accountants and 
Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party," Notre Dame
Lawyer 47 (Fall, 1972):593.
doctrine. In Glanzer v. S h e p a r d 3 5  (Glanzer) the New York 
Court saw fit to extend an obligation beyond an existent 
contract, to a third party. The court reasoned that 
because the defendant knew that his services were to 
primarily benefit the third party, an obligation did exist. 
When the third party is "the end and aim of the transaction 
a relationship equivalent to that of privity of contract 
exists and recovery for negligent misrepresentation should 
be g r a n t e d . 3^ Yet, for many years courts passed over this 
concept of primary benefit by ruling it inapplicable to 
the area of accountants’ liability to third party statement 
users.
It was not until the late sixties that the concept 
of primary benefit was applied by the judiciary to the 
area of accountants’ liability. At that time, several 
courts postulated that when the accountant specifically 
knew the third party, and when the public accountant 
specifically knew that his work was to be relied upon by 
that third party in making financial decisions, the Glanzer 
Rule of primary benefit, and not the Ultramares Rule of 
privity of contract should be a p p l i e d . 37 Thus, the concept
35Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
36tiTorts— Professional Negligence— Accountants may be 
Liable to Third Parties for Negligence," Texas Law Review 
59 (January, 1972):411.
37see Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W. 2d 395 (Iowa 1969); and 
Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Swartz, 
Bresenoff, Yavner and Jacobs, 455 P. 2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972)
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of primary benefit was advanced as a major Inroad into 
the Ultramares Concept of the legal liability of public 
accountants for negligence in the examination of financial 
statements.
With this one inroad into the precedent of the New 
York Court established, several courts were willing to 
take the next step toward the institution of more liberal 
concepts of accountants’ third party liability. The 
first step toward such a liberalization was the broadening 
of the primary benefit rule of Glanzer. Many courts 
sought to eliminate the limitation of the Glanzer Rule, 
and therefore, argued that the accountant should be held 
liable for his negligence to that class of individuals 
which was actually foreseen by the accountant and which 
did actually rely upon the misstatement of the public 
accountant.38 The general argument which has been 
presented by these courts is that a rule which allows 
recovery by all members of a specifically foreseen class 
more equitably distributes the burden of the misstatement 
between the accountant and the third party.39 While the 
concept of foreseeability has been generally accepted
^Arthur j. Marinelli, Jr., "The Expanding Scope 
of Accountants’ Liability to Third Parties," Case 
Western Reserve Law Review 23 (November, 1971): 122.
^^Rusch Factors, Incorporated v. Levin, 284 F.
Supp. 85 (R.I. 1968).
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in cases of personal injury, its evolution into the area 
of pecuniary loss has been a slow and tedious process.
The final judicial interpretation of the account­
ant’s liability to third parties for the negligent exami­
nation of financial statements is also the most liberal 
interpretation. In 1933 and 1934, Congress instituted the 
Securities Acts as measures of protection for the 
investing public. Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933 imposes upon public accountants civil liability for 
the misrepresentation or omission of material facts which 
are required to be set forth in the registration state­
ment. In a similar manner, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 imposes liability for false or misleading statements.̂  
While the 1934 act requires the third party to prove that
he relied upon the misrepresentation, the 1933 act assumes 
the existence of this factor. The total effect of these 
two pieces of legislation, and the administrative rules 
promulgated under them, is to impose upon the accounting 
profession a virtually unlimited amount of liability 
for negligence in the handling of the financial state­
ments of registered corporations.
While the Securities Acts were passed in the early 
thirties, they had no significant effect on the area of 
accountants’ liability until the sixties. The first 
significant case was decided in 1968, and seemed to open
^°Murphy, pp. 389-390.
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a whole new area of legal concern. In Escott v. BarChris 
Construction Corporation**1 (BarChrls) the court used the 
provisions of the Securities Acts to hold an accountant 
liable for negligence in the performance of his audit 
duties. Thus, the broadest theory of the accountant’s 
legal responsibilities became a significant point of 
consideration for the certified public accountant.
The accountant can be— and has often been— held 
liable to third party statement users for any act ranging 
from fraud to simple negligence. The exact degree of 
responsibility can only be determined by a given court at 
a given time. Ultimately, that degree of responsibility 
will be directly dependent upon the theory of liability 
placement selected and applied by the court. Therefore, 
the accountant is confronted with an ever changing, and 
thus, extremely complex situation.
Statement of Purpose
The problem existent in the area of accountants’ 
liability is a complex one, for at present, there is no 
firm basis upon which the accountant may evaluate his 
potential legal responsibility to third party statement 
users. The solution to this problem is quite obvious. 
There must be established a workable set of rules that the 
courts can apply to individual fact situations. While 
several such workable principles are available to the
■̂'■Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation, 283 
P. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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courts, no single concept, or combination of concepts, 
has been generally accepted by the courts.2*2
The common law Is not In Itself self-executing; 
that Is, legal doctrines may remain dormant for many years 
before a single court in a single situation sees fit to 
resurrect that concept for application. For this reason, 
the common law cannot be relied upon to produce an effec-
li otive doctrine of accountants’ legal liability. J Since 
the answer to the accountant's problem is not to be found 
in the common law, accountants must rely upon some outside 
source for any workable solution.
This dissertation attempts to develop a basic 
concept of legal liability upon which such a solution may 
be based. In striving for this goal two basic definitions 
are sought. First, an attempt is made to define a mecha­
nism which could be employed to reconcile the professional 
and legal interpretations of the accountant's responsi­
bilities. Second, this dissertation attempts to define 
the conditions necessary for the imposition of third party 
liability. In pursuing this task the goals of equity and 
certainty are always kept in mind. In this way the rights 
of both the third party and the accountant are properly 
balanced, and the applicable legal doctrines will be
**2Walter J. Coakley, "Accountants' Legal Liability," 
Journal of Accountancy 126 (July, 1968):59*
^victor M. Earle, "The Litigation Explosion," 
Journal of Accountancy 129 (March, 1970):65.
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understood by each. By accomplishing all of these tasks, 
the path will be cleared for the development of a single 
concept of accountants' third party liability.
Statement of Methodology 
In the pursuit of these goals, this dissertation 
takes a threefold approach. First, a study of the litera­
ture— both from legal and accounting sources— has been 
undertaken in order to gain a basic understanding of the 
arguments surrounding the area of accountants' third 
party liability. Second, an examination has been made 
of all existent statutes and legal dicta which relate 
to the topic of accountants' liability. Such a study has 
revealed the principles and reasoning which currently 
underlie the legal theory of accountants' liability. 
Finally, a study of other related areas of the law, and 
potentially applicable legal doctrines, has been under­
taken in an attempt to survey the logic behind doctrines 
basic to other areas of the law of torts. This information 
has been used to synthesize the various concepts of tort 
law into one formal concept which could govern the area 
of accountants' liability to third party statement users.
Summary
The certified public accountant faces a complex and 
confusing legal situation when dealing with third party 
financial statement users. Both the decisions and dicta 
of the modern courts have added to the legal problems of
23
the public accountant. The courts have not only commented 
on the degree of liability which governs specific types 
of accountant-third party relationships, but have also 
commented on the duties and practices of the accounting 
profession as a whole.
This dissertation attempts to find a solution to 
the complex legal problems facing public accountants. In 
pursuing this goal a four step approach has been taken. 
First, the historical development of the concepts which 
today govern accountants' legal liability is traced. 
Second, a detailed analysis of the current legal situation 
is provided. Third, the major arguments surrounding the 
area of accountants' third party liability are discussed. 
Finally, a set of basic concepts to govern the accountant- 
third party relationship is developed. Such a systematic 
approach to the problem yields a useful and workable 
solution to the legal problems of the public accounting 
profession.
CHAPTER II
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OP 
ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY
The legal liability of certified public account­
ants to third party statement users has its roots in two 
separate and distinct bodies of law. While the common 
law doctrines of accountants' legal liability developed 
first, statutory liability, as codified in the securities 
legislation of the thirties, has also played a major 
role in the evolution of the accountant's current legal 
predicament. This chapter takes a two step approach 
in tracing the historical development of the concepts of 
accountants' legal liability. The first section of this 
chapter traces the evolution of the concepts which today 
form the basis of accountants' common law liability to 
third parties. The second section of this chapter 
traces the evolution of the statutes which combine with 
common law doctrines to form the entire basis of the 
accountant's third party legal liability.
Development of Accountants' Common 
Law Liability
It was once argued, by Justice Holmes, that the 
common law had inherent in it an element of certainty.
2k
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Yet, the ease by case nature of the common law, which 
continually allows Individual courts to make changes and 
accommodations, has often turned this supposed element 
of certainty into a myth.1 This same case by case system 
of accommodation and change was the legal entity which 
eventually produced the common law doctrines to govern 
the relationship existent between the certified public 
accountant and the financial statement user.
The specific common law doctrines which were to 
be applied to the accountant-third party relationship 
developed in several stages. First, there were the early 
English Cases which dealt with the basic concepts of tort 
and contract law. The concepts developed in these cases 
were later to provide the theoretical foundation upon 
which accountants' common law liability would be admin­
istered. Second, there were the cases in which the 
American Courts advanced interpretations of the early 
British Theories. It was here that the early theories 
were often modified to deal with particular situations. 
Finally, there were the cases which precipitated the New 
York Rule. The development of this rule represented an 
attempt on the part of the New York Court to consolidate 
the common law of accountants' liability, while, at the 
same time, providing for the basic needs of economic
■^Thomas W. Hill, Jr., "The Public Accountants'
Legal Liability .to Clients and Others," New York Certified 
Public Accountant 38 (January, 1968):24.
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society. A discussion of theBe three stages of common 
law development follows.
The Early English Doctrines 
The first of the English contributions to the 
area of accountants’ third party liability was set forth 
in the case of Winterbottom v. Wright2 (Winterbottom).
In this case, Lord Abinger ruled that where a person was 
injured as a result of the negligent performance of a 
contract to which he was not a party, that injured 
person had no right of action based upon the contract. 
Where there was a lack of privity between the parties, 
there was a lack of an existent duty which was a neces­
sary element of all actions based upon a charge of negli­
gence. 3 in expressing this sentiment, the Winterbottom 
Court stated:
There is no privity of contract between these 
parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, every 
passenger, or even any person passing along the 
road, who was injured by the upsetting of the 
coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we 
confine the operations of such contracts as this 
to the parties who entered into them, the most 
absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can 
see no limit, would ensue. . . .
^Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 198, 152 
Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
^Richard C. Rastetter, Jr., "Torts— Accountants 
are Liable to Third Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation 
when Both the Nature of the Transaction and the Group 
to Which the Thrid Party Belongs are Known to the Account­
ant," Drake Law Review 20 (January, 1971):412.
^Winterbottom.
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Thus, the first of the applicable common law concepts—  
that of privity of contract— was not the result of any 
specific legal doctrine, but instead, was the result of 
the court’s belief that the only safe policy to pursue 
was that of limiting liability to those who were parties 
to a particular contract.^
While the bar of privity of contract as espoused 
by the English Courts would seem to have been an absolute 
preclusion to third party recovery, the courts were quick 
to specify situations in which recovery would be allowed.
In 1889, the English Courts accepted a charge of fraudulent 
misrepresentation as the basis of an action. In Derry 
v. Peek  ̂ (Derry) the court recognized the right of a 
third party to recover damages caused by the fraudulent 
statements of a defendant. A charge of fraud, according 
to the Derry Court, could be based on either false state­
ments, or statements made with a reckless disregard for 
the truth.' The court delineated the basis of any such 
action by saying:
. . . where a man makes a statement to be acted upon 
by others which is false, and which is known by him 
to be false, or is made by him recklessly, or without
care whether it is true or false, that is, without
any reasonable grounds for believing it to be true,
he is liable in an action of deceit at the suit of
anyone to whom it was addressed or anyone of the
5Ibid.
6Derry v. Peek, 14 A.C. 337 (1889).
^Rastetter.
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class to whom it was addressed and who was materially 
Induced by the misstatement to do an act to his 
prejudice.®
Yet, In defining the limits of an action based on
fraudulent misrepresentation, the Derry Court was careful
to point out the basic distinctions which existed between
actionable fraud and other nonactionable torts. In
doing so, the court stated:
A false statement, made through carelessness and 
without reasonable ground for believing it to be 
true, may be evidence of fraud but does not necessarily 
amount to fraud. Such a statement, if made in the 
honest belief that it is true, is not fraudulent and 
does not render the person making it liable to an 
action of deceit.9
Thus, the English Courts began to assault the citadel
of privity by allowing third parties a means of recovery
under certain well defined circumstances. Yet, this
first assault was a highly qualified one, for before an
action for fraudulent misrepresentation would be accepted
by the courts, the plaintiff was required to prove that
the defendant knew of the falsity of the statement, and
that the plaintiff’s reliance upon the misrepresentation
caused him to suffer injury. Fraudulent misrepresentation,
therefore, was a valid cause of action, but action for
negligent misrepresentation was still to be precluded




While some of the major areas of the English 
Common Law seem to have been closing In on the public 
accountant, there was one area of the law which provided 
the accountant with a great deal of legal protection.
When the courts were finally required to define the 
limits of the public auditor's responsibility, the 
concepts adhered to were no more stringent than those 
which the public accountants had established for them­
selves. In two separate decisions, the English Courts 
held that public accountants were not guarantors. The 
courts felt that accountants did not provide individuals 
with a warranty as to the accuracy of their reports. 
Accountants, the courts reasoned, could not be expected 
to find every mistake or defalcation, but instead, could 
only be expected to apply the skill and care which would 
be used by a reasonable and prudent accountant in the 
same situation.10 In one of these two English Cases the 
court went so far as to specify the duties of the auditor 
by saying:
. . .  in determining whether any misfeasence or 
breach of duty has been committed, it is essential 
to consider what the duties of the auditor are. . . . 
Shortly they may be stated thus: It is the duty
of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he has 
to perform that skill, care, and caution which a 
reasonably competent, careful, and cautious auditor 
would use. What is reasonable skill, care, and 
caution must depend on the particular circumstances 
of each case. An auditor is not bound to be a detec­
tive, or, as was said, to approach his work with
10See ln re London and General Bank [1895] 2 Ch. 
673; and In re Kingston Cotton Mill Company [1896] 2 Ch. 
279.
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suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there 
was something wrong. He is a watchdog, but not a 
bloodhound. He is justified in believing tried 
servants of the company in whom confidence is placed 
by the company. He is entitled to assume that they 
are honest, and to rely upon their representations, 
provided he takes reasonable care. If there is 
anything calculated to excite suspicion, he should 
probe it to the bottomj but in the absence of any­
thing of that kind he is only bound to be reasonably 
cautious and careful.H
It was this concept as put forth in the early English 
Decisions, which institutionalized public accounting as 
a skilled profession. Thus, accountants were afforded 
the opportunity to design the legal standards by which 
they would be judged.
The nineteenth century English Courts advanced 
four concepts which were to play significant roles in the 
evolution of accountants' common law liability. The 
concept of privity of contract, the definition of fraudu­
lent misrepresentation, the distinction between fraud 
and other lesser torts, and the definition of accounting 
as a skilled profession were all to be significant factors 
in the development of further legal doctrines. The stage 
was thus set for other courts to apply these judicial 
theories to some specific fact situations.
The American Interpretations 
One of the major factors in the industrial develop­
ment of the United States was the ability of the corporate 
form of organization to facilitate the separation of
•^Kingston Cotton Mill.
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management and ownership. As this functional separation 
grew, there arose the need for an independent check 
on the activities of management. The accounting profes­
sion migrated to this country in an attempt to alleviate 
that need.
As the profession moved from England to the United 
States, the legal doctrines which had been developed 
to govern the accountant-financial statement user relation' 
ship became a more significant part of the American Common 
Law. While the American Courts were quick in adopting 
the concepts initially developed in the English System, 
the courts were also quick to modify and to advance 
further interpretations of these basic principles.
In Seaver v. Ransom-1-2 (Seaver) the American Court 
noted that several jurisdictions had extended liability 
beyond the parties to a contract, to individuals which 
the court called "beneficiaries” of the c o n t r a c t . Y e t ,  
the Seaver Court made it extremely clear that the general 
rule governing such extra-contractual relationships 
was the earlier concept of privity of contract. The 
court expressed this feeling by saying:
The general rule, both in law and equity was that 
privity between a plaintiff and a defendant is neces­
sary to the maintenance of an action on contract. The 
consideration must be furnished by the party to whom




the promise was made. The contract cannot be enforced 
against the third party, and therefore it cannot 
be enforced by him.14
One year later, in the case of Landell v. Lybrand1  ̂
(Landell) the American Courts set out to formalize the 
distinction between fraud and negligence which the Derry 
Court had alluded to several decades before.1  ̂ In 
making this basic distinction, the court said:
There were no contractual relations between 
the plaintiff and defendants, and, if there is any 
liability from them to him, it must arise out of 
some breach of duty, for there is no averment that 
they made the report with intent to deceive him.
The averment in the statement of claim is that the 
defendants were careless and negligent in making 
their report; but the plaintiff was a stranger to 
them and to it, and, as no duty rested upon them to 
him, they cannot be guilty of any negligence of 
which he can complain. . . .' (Italics mine.)
Thus, the Landell Court interpreted the element of intent
to be the major factor of distinction between pure and
actionable fraud and simple and nonactionable negligence.
This distinction would seem to have provided honest
accountants with an insurmountable defense against third
X 8party actions.
l/iIbid.




•^Joseph P. Dawson, "Auditors’ Third Party Liability: 
An Ill-Considered Extension of the Law," Washington Law 
Review 46 (1971):675.
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Even as the Seaver and Landell Courts were reas­
serting the validity of the early English Theories, other 
American Courts were advancing significant modifications 
of the basic legal concepts. This slow process of 
modification was eventually to result in a series of 
third party actions based on simple negligence.
When Donald C. MacPherson was injured in a defec­
tive Buick Motor Car, the process of modification began. 
The New York Court in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company1  ̂
(MacPherson) circumvented the concept of privity of 
contract, and allowed an injured third party to recover 
damages from a negligent manufacturer. In justifying 
its decision, the court referred to the eminent danger 
associated with the use of certain products, and thus, 
embarked into a new area of manufacturers * product 
liability. The court justified its finding by stating 
that:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is 
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril 
when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. 
Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be 
expected. If to the element of danger then is 
added knowledge that the thing will be used by 
persons other than the purchaser, and used without 
new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the 
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a 
duty to make it carefully.
Liability for negligence in the manufacture of 
a physical product was to be the furthest extension of




the common law for six years. Then, in the case of 
Glanzer v. Shepard‘S  (Glanzer) the New York Court was 
presented with the opportunity to express an opinion 
on the liability of a professional for negligence in 
the performance of a service. In the Glanzer Case, 
the court imposed upon a weigher of beans an extra- 
contractual duty, extending beyond his employer to a 
third party plaintiff. The court argued that while the 
plaintiff, the buyer of the beans, was not a party to 
the contract, he was the primary beneficiary of the 
contract. The court expressed its opinion of the duties 
of the weigher by saying:
We think the law imposes a duty toward buyer 
as well as seller in the situation here disclosed.
The plaintiffs’ use of the certificates was not an 
indirect or collateral consequence of the action of 
the weighers. It was a consequence which, to the 
weighers' knowledge, was the end and aim of the 
transaction. Bech, Van Siclen and Company [the 
seller] ordered, but Glanzer Brothers [the buyers] 
were to use. The defendants held themselves out 
to the public as skilled and careful in their calling. 
They knew that the beans had been sold, and that on 
the faith of their certificate payment would be 
made. . . .22
The Glanzer Case was thought to be the first step toward 
allowing third parties to recover pecuniary losses caused 
by the negligence of others.2  ̂ This trend toward
21Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
22Ibid.
23Richard L. Miller, "Public Accountants and Attor­
neys: Negligence and the Third Party," Notre Dame Lawyer
47 (Pall, 1972):591•
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liberalization of the laws of negligence was to continue 
for another eight years.
The American Courts soon began to supplant the 
old English Doctrines with the new, more liberal, concepts 
of the Galnzer and MacPherson Courts. In the case of
OilInternational Paper Products v. Erie Railroad Company 
(Erie) the court applied the primary benefit rule of 
Glanzer in allowing an injured third party an opportunity 
to recover the pecuniary losses which were caused by 
a negligent misrepresentation. Yet, the Erie Court went 
one step beyond the Glanzer Decision by delineating the 
four basic conditions which were necessary for such 
recovery. First, the court felt that the defendant in 
such an action must have had prior knowledge that the 
information was desired by the plaintiff for a serious 
purpose. Second, the court found that the defendant must 
have had prior knowledge as to the plaintiff's intent 
to undertake action based on the information. Third, the 
court ruled that the defendant must have realized that 
false information would result in injury to the plaintiff. 
Finally, the court argued that the relationship existent 
between the parties, disregarding the existence of a 
contract, must have been such that in good conscience 
the plaintiff had the right to rely on the information,
p l i International Paper Products v. Erie Railroad 
Company, 224 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927).
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and the defendant had the duty to supply the Information
with care.^5
The liberalizations of the common law which
resulted from the decisions in the Glanzer and MacPherson
Cases, and the interpretation of those decisions by the
Erie Court, would seem to have produced serious cracks
in the once impregnable citadel of privity. The primary
benefit rule as espoused by the Glanzer Court had become
so well entrenched that in 1930, in the case of Doyle v.
26Chatham and Phenix National Bank (Doyle), the concept 
was applied to the relationship which existed between 
a bank and the purchasers of a group of indemnities which 
the bank had certified to be completely secured. By 
this time, it seemed that only one further legal step 
was necessary to reach the public accountant.
While the early American Courts rarely had an 
opportunity to comment on the common law liability of 
public accountants, their liberal rulings on other 
related matters would tend to indicate a great degree of 
receptivity to third party suits. With the basic doc­
trines of the American and English Courts established, 
it remained for the New York Court to fashion these 
various legal theories into a unified approach to the
25Ibid.
P Doyle v. Chatham and Phenix National Bank, 224 
N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930).
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accountant’s common law liability to third party financial 
statement users.
The New York Rule
While the first three decades of the twentieth
century provided the courts with a number of opportunities
to comment of the liability of professionals to third
parties, public accountants were the subject of few of
these cases. Yet, the financial collapse of 1929,
brought with it not only an increase in the awareness
of the certified public accountant’s role, but also, an
increase in the belief that public accountants were
infallible detectives. This over dependency on the
reports of public accountants soon provided the courts
with the opportunity that had been lacking for almost
thirty years.
Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven and 
27Company ' (Ultramares) represents the first case in 
which the courts attempted to develop a set of legal 
doctrines which could govern the liability of public 
accountants for losses suffered by third parties and 
caused by the negligence, or fraud, of the accountant. 
Eight years later, the decision advanced in State Street 
Trust Company v. E r n s t (State Street) joined Ultramares
2^Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven and 
Company, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
Q State Street Trust Company v. Ernst, 278 N.Y.
104, 15 N.E. 2d 4l6 (1938).
to form a solid base of common law precedent (the New 
York Rule) which would control the area of accountants1 
liability to third parties for more than twenty-five
onyears.^
The Ultramares Court took quick action to put 
a halt to the progressive trend which had been started 
by the courts in MacPherson, Glanzer, Erie and Doyle.
In refusing to extend the liberal doctrines any further, 
the Ultramares Court specified only two situations in 
which an injured third party could recover damages from 
a public accountant. In the first situation, a third 
party could recover damages from the accountant if it 
could be proven that the accountant was fraudulent in 
making the misrepresentation. In the second situation, 
the third party could recover damages from the accountant 
if it could be proven that the third party was both the 
primary beneficiary of the accountant's contract, and 
specifically known to the public accountant.̂ ° The 
existence of either of these situations was to be a 
question of fact, and thus, was subject to the decision 
of a jury.
The reassertion of the old privity doctrine by 
the Ultramares and State Street Courts constituted a
2QHenry B. Reiling and Russel A. Taussig, "Recent 
Liability Cases— Implications for Accountants," Journal 
of Accountancy 130 (September, 1970)r^O.
^°Don Collier, "Negligence— Accountants are Liable 
to Third Parties for Failure to Exercise Reasonable Care," 
Texas Tech Law Review 3 (Fall, 1971):213-214.
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significant limitation in the progression of the law 
of n e g l i g e n c e . Yet, the courts did offer to the injured 
third party two significant expansions of the law of 
fraud. First, the scope of the accountant's liability 
for fraudulent misrepresentation was expanded to include 
those parties who would foreseeably rely upon the account­
ant's certification. Prior to the Ultramares and State 
Street Decisions, professionals had been held responsible 
only to the parties who were intended to be influenced 
by the fraudulent action. Second, the laws governing 
fraudulent misrepresentation were expanded to allow a 
jury to draw an inference of fraud from evidence which 
only proved the gross negligence of the certified public 
accountant. As Judge Finch pointed out in the State 
Street Decision:
Accountants, however, may be liable to third parties, 
even where there is lacking deliberate or active 
fraud. A representation certified as true to the 
knowledge of the accountants when knowledge there 
is none, a reckless misstatement, or an opinion 
based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion 
that there was no genuine belief in its truth, are all 
sufficient upon which to base liability. A refusal to 
see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful, 
if sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading 
to an inference of fraud so as to impose liability 
for losses suffered by those who rely on the balance 
sheet. In other words, heedlessness and reckless
^Leonard Mentzer, "Accountant's Common Law Liability 
to Third Persons for Misrepresentation," California Law 
Review 57 (1969):28l.
32"Torts— Professional Negligence— Accountants 
may be Liable to Third Parties for Negligence," Texas 
Law Review 50 (January, 1972):412.
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disregard of consequence may take the place of deliberate intention.33
This interrelationship between the law of gross negligence
and the law of fraud was to constitute a most complex
doctrine of common law liability.
Although the plaintiffs in Ultramares asked the 
court to apply the previously espoused concepts of 
Glanzer, Erie and Doyle, the court proceded to delineate 
several fine distinctions which precluded the application 
of the earlier doctrines. In distinguishing the Glanzer 
and Ultramares Cases, the court argued that the relation­
ships existent between the parties to the suits were 
different in the two situations. In explaining these 
differences, the Ultramares Court said:
Here [Glanzer] was something more than the rendi­
tion of a service in the expectation that the one 
who ordered the certificate would use it thereafter 
in the operations of his business as occasion might 
require. Here [Glanzer] was a case where the 
transmission of the certificate to another was not 
merely one possibility among many, but the 'end and 
aim of the transaction,' as certain and immediate 
and deliberately willed as if a husband were to 
order a gown to be delivered to his wife, or a 
telegraph company, contracting with the sender of 
a message, were to telegraph it wrongly to the damage 
of the person expected to receive it . . . The 
bond was so close as to approach privity, if not 
completely one with it. Not so in the case at hand [Ultramares]. . . .34
This policy of distinction, based on the relationship 




to the Erie Decision. In explaining this distinction, 
the Ultramares Court said:
Here [Erie] was a determinate relation, that of 
bailor and bailee, either present or prospective, 
with peculiar opportunity for knowledge on the part 
of the bailee as to the subject-matter of the state­
ment and with a continuing duty to correct if 
erroneous. Even the narrowest holdings as to the 
liability for unintentional misstatement concede 
that a representation in such circumstances may be 
equivalent to a warranty. . . .35
The process of distinction was brought to a close with
Justice Cardozo’s comment on the Doyle Case. The
Ultramares Court pointed to the basic differences in
circumstances by saying:
• • • [Doyle] is even more plainly indecisive. A 
trust company was a trustee under a deed of trust 
to secure an issue of bonds. It was held liable 
to a subscriber for the bonds when it certified 
them falsely. . . .36
The primary beneficiary relationship of Glanzer, the
prospective bailor-bailee relationship of Erie and
the trustee-subscriber relationship of Doyle were the
legal distinctions advanced to justify the change in
direction which was taken by the Ultramares Court. Yet,
further analysis would tend to indicate that the New




37R0zny v. Marnul, 43 111. 2d 54, 250 N.E. 2d 656 
(1969).
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When examined in the light of earlier common 
law decisions, the rulings in Ultramares and State Street 
seem slightly inconsistent. Legal precedent would have 
dictated the imposition of liability in both of these 
cases.33 Yet, beyond the basic legal considerations,
Justice Cardozo advanced three extra-legal arguments 
to justify the establishment of the New York Rule.
First, while the courts advanced the lack of privity 
as the reason for the Ultramares and State Street Decisions, 
the fear of an indeterminate liability weighed heavy 
on the minds of the jurists. The Ultramares Court felt 
that the imposition of legal liability in this particular 
case would place upon the entire accounting profession 
an enormous amount of legal pressure. The court further 
believed that this legal pressure would ultimately result 
in the financial collapse of public accounting, and thus, 
the loss of a valuable discipline.39 Justice Cardozo 
expressed this fear by saying:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless 
slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or 
forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may 
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
class. The hazards of a business conducted on these 
terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether 
a flaw may not exist in the imposition of^a duty 
that exposes to these consequences. . . .
OQ
"Torts— Negligence— Accountant Held Liable to a 
Third Party Not in Privity," The University of Kansas 




Second, the courts in Ultramares and State Street 
seemed to believe that if third party liability for 
negligent misrepresentation were extended to the account­
ing profession, the same degree of legal responsibility 
would soon be applied to all other skilled professions. 
Lawyers, architects and engineers would soon be subject 
to the same "indeterminate'1 liability as accountants.**1 
The Ultramares Court expressed its fear of this almost 
certain result by saying:
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this 
case will extend to many callings other than an 
auditor's. Lawyers who certify their opinion as 
to the validity of municipal or corporate bonds, 
with knowledge that their opinion will be brought 
to the notice of the public, will become liable to 
the investor, if they have overlooked a statute or 
a decision, to the same extent as if the controversy 
were one between client and advisor. Title companies 
issuing titles to a tract of land, with knowledge 
that at an approaching auction the fact that they 
have insured will be stated to the bidders, will 
become liable to purchasers who may wish the benefit 
of a policy without payment of a premium. These 
illustrations may seem to be extreme, but they go 
little, if any farther than we are invited to go now. . . .42
Finally, the Ultramares and State Street Courts 
expressed the belief that the services of public account­
ants were provided primarily for the benefit of their 
clients. The Ultramares Court expressed its view of the 
"public" in public accounting by saying that:
. . . public accountants are public only in the 
sense that their services are offered to any one
^Gammel v. Ernst and Ernst, 72 N.W. 2d 364 (Minn.
1955).
2i pncUltramares.
who chooses to employ them. This is far from saying 
that those who do not employ them are in the same 
position as those who do.43
Thus, it would seem that these three considerations of
social policy, and not pure legal precedent, served
as the basis of the New York Rule.
The English Courts began the development of the 
common law liability of public accountants by delineating 
a set of basic legal principles. While these principles 
did not constitute a complete doctrine of common law, 
they did supply a foundation upon which other doctrines 
could be built. The American Courts began this building 
process just after the turn of the century. It was here 
that the basic English Concepts were interpreted, and 
finally modified into a set of legal doctrines which 
could be applied to the area of accountants' liability. 
Thirty years later, the New York Courts began the process 
of balancing these legal concepts with the basic concepts 
of social need. This balancing process was to result in 
the promulgation of the New York Rule— a concept which 
was to govern the common law liability of public account­
ants to third party financial statement users for many 
years to come.
Development of Accountants' Statutory Liability
As the twentieth century began, the activities of 
most business enterprises were both expanding and
43Ibid.
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differentiating. While the ordinary citizen’s involvement 
in the world of commerce had become more intense, the 
average investor had found that it was virtually impossible 
to personally obtain all of the information necessary 
for the making of economic decisions. Therefore, the 
prudent investor found it desirable to rely upon informa­
tion procured, and verified, by other parties. The public 
accountant was to be one of those other parties.
While the investing public was making the necessary 
transition, most state legislatures, and the United States 
Congress, were realizing the significance of this newly 
formed relationship. It was this realization which 
spurred most of these law-making bodies toward the enact­
ment of specific pieces of legislation. These pieces 
of legislation were passed in an attempt to provide 
a firm base of information upon which the entire economic 
system might develop.^ This element of statutory control 
evolved through three stages. First, there were the "blue 
sky laws" which were enacted by various state legislatures. 
Second, there were the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as established by the 
United States Congress. Finally, there were the rules 
and regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. An historical perspective of each of these
^U.S., Congress, House, Securities Exchange Bill 
of 1934, H.R. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1934, p. 5.
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statutory mechanisms, and a discussion of their immediate 
effects upon the accounting profession, follows.
The State Blue Sky Laws
Prior to 1930, most states enacted some form of 
statute in an attempt to prohibit the sale of fraudulent 
securities. While these blue sky laws did not have a 
significant effect upon the liability of public accountants 
to third party statement users, an examination of their 
failings provides some insight into the development of 
similar, and more significant, federal legislation.
In general, the blue sky laws which were enacted 
by the states failed to control the sale of fraudulent 
securities for three reasons. First, business activity 
had evolved to a level where interstate transactions 
were ordinary. Due to this evolution, the smart salesman 
could avoid the laws of a specific state by simply staying 
out of that state’s jurisdictions. While the Constitution 
did provide for the mandatory extradition of criminals, 
a loophold in the law^5 allowed most parties guilty of
^The Constitution states, "A person charged in any 
State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee 
from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on 
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which 
he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having 
Jurisdiction of the Crime." U.S., Constitution, art. IV, 
sec. 2. Unfortunately for state governments, the courts 
interpreted the word "flee" to mean that the individual 
must have been present in the state at some prior time. 
Thus, if the seller of securities totally avoided the 
state where the sale was made, no extradition would be 
possible. Louis Loss, Securities Regulation (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1951), p. 56.
a securities related crime to avoid punishment. Second, 
while most blue sky laws did provide for adequate punish­
ment, the legislatures which enacted those statutes 
usually failed to provide funds adequate for their proper 
enforcement. It was not uncommon for a poor and weak 
agency of the state to face a rich and powerful corpora­
tion In a legal battle over the enforcement of blue sky 
laws. The result of such a battle often weakened the 
entire structure of the state law. Finally, many of the 
laws passed by the states were simply illusory. While 
most of the state statutes seemed airtight on the surface, 
the exemption provisions attached to those statutes 
often negated their effect.1̂  Thus, it would seem that 
the attempts of individual states to regulate interstate 
commerce met with utter failure.
The Federal Securities Statutes 
The federal government soon realized that the 
state statutes would not be effective in controling 
securities transactions. As such, efforts to effectuate 
truth in securities transactions through legislative 
means began at the national level as early as 1919. In 
that year, the Taylor Bill was introduced to the House 
of Representatives. This particular piece of legislation 
was modeled after the English Companies Act, and thus, 
would have required companies involved in Interstate
^Loss, pp. 56-58.
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commerce to register their securities with the Treasury 
Department. Furthermore, the bill would have imposed 
upon anyone signing the registration statement civil 
liability for material misstatements. One year later, 
Representative Volstead sponsored another form of securi­
ties legislation. Unfortunately for the unsophisticated 
investor, neither of these bills was ever to be reported 
out of committee.
It would seem that the stock market crash of 1929 
was the force which was necessary to spur Congress toward 
the finalization of specific statutes designed to control 
the major securities markets. After that economic collapse, 
and several years of the deep depression which followed, 
Congress took definite steps to insure that potential 
investors would always have the information necessary for 
the making of their economic decisions. These steps 
culminated in the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Each of these pieces 
of legislation was eventually to have a significant impact 
upon the area of accountants’ legal liability to third 
party financial statement users.
When Congress implemented the Securities Act of 
1933 it seems that the accomplishment of two basic goals 
was sought. First, the statute was designed to provide 
investors with necessary financial information. To 
accomplish this purpose, Congress required all affected
^7Ibid. pp. 65-66.
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corporations to file registration statements concerning 
the issuance of new securities. The information contained 
in these registration statements was to be sufficient 
to allow a prudent investor to make an adequate appraisal 
of any new security i s s u e . S e c o n d ,  and probably more 
important for the public accounting profession, the 
statute sought to establish a force which would deter 
the financial abuses which had been so prevalent only 
ten years before. To accomplish this task, the act 
imposed civil liability upon anyone making a material 
misstatement in the registration of an affected security. 
Section 11 specifically imposes such civil liability 
upon experts associated with the registration statement 
by saying:
In case any part of the registration statement when 
such part became effective, contained an untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a 
material fact required to be stated therein or 
necessary to make the statements therein not mis­
leading, any person acquiring such security . . . 
may, either at law or in equity, in any court of 
competent jurisdiction, sue . . .
. . . every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, 
or any person whose profession gives authority to a 
statement made by him, who has with his consent been 
named as having prepared or certified any part of the 
registration statement, or as having prepared or 
certified any report or valuation which is used in 
connection with the registration statement . . .50
JiO°Charles H. Meyer, The Securities Exchange Act of 
1934: Analyzed and Explained (New York: Francis Emory 
Fitch, 1934), p. 157.
iiq̂Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corpora­
tion, 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
^Securities Act of 1933i U.S. Code, Title 1 5 s sec. 
77 (1970T
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Congress soon realized that while the element of 
control inherent in the Securities Act of 1933 was 
significant, the fact that the control feature only 
applied to issues of new securities represented a serious 
limitation in the legislative scheme. To correct this 
flaw in the 1933 act, Congress instituted a system of 
continuous control through the passage of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 193^. ̂  The 193^ act was similar to 
the earlier legislation in that it provided for both 
information dissemination and civil law deterrence. The 
deterrence feature of this particular piece of legislation 
was provided in Section 18 which stated:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made 
any statement in any application, report, or document 
filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regula­
tion thereunder . . . which statement was at the time 
and in the light of the circumstances under which 
it was made false or misleading with respect to any 
material fact, shall be liable to any person . . . 
who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have 
purchased or sold a security at a price which was 
affected by such statement, for damages caused by 
such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove 
that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge 
that such statement was false or misleading.52
While it was almost thirty years before any court 
undertook to define the exact liability which these 
acts imposed upon the accounting profession, it was 
generally accepted that these statutes would impose 
upon the certified public accountant liability at least
■^Milton H. Cohen MtTruthin Securities' Revisited," 
Harvard Law Review 79 (1966):13^1.
-^Securities Exchange Act of 193^* U.S. Code,
Title 15, sec. 78r (19/0)7
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as great as that which was barred by Justice Cardozo 
just three years e a r l i e r . 53
The Securities and Exchange 
Commission Regulations
While Congress felt that the Securities Act of 1933 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided an adequate 
means of securities regulation, some farsighted members of 
the legislature realized that flexible laws were prerequi­
site to controlling a constantly changing financial world. 
Thus, Congress established the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in an attempt to provide an authoritative body 
which would constantly administer the Securities Acts in 
such a way as to guarantee investor protection. One of 
the first major rules which was to be promulgated by this 
quasi-judicial body— Rule 10b-5— was eventually to have 
a significant impact upon the liability of public account­
ants to third party financial statement users.
Soon after the passage of the Securities Acts, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission realized that it 
had little or no power over frauds perpetrated by security 
purchasers. To rectify this situation, the Commission 
asked Congress to amend Section 17(a) of the Securities 
Act of 1 9 3 3 In 19^2, one year after the unanswered
53william 0. Douglas and George E. Bates, "The 
Federal Securities Act of 1933j" Yale Law Journal 43 
(December, 1933):197-198.
^Arnold S. Jacobs, The Impact of Rule 10b-5 
(New York: Clark Boardman Company, 1974), p. 1-108.
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request for congressional action, the Securities and
Exchange Commission took steps on its own to fill this
gap which existed in its arsenal of protective devices.55
To accomplish this, the Commission adopted Rule 10b-5
which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instru­
mentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice 
to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of anysecurity.56
While the initial promulgation of Rule 10b-5 was perceived 
to have little effect upon the accounting profession, 
it was to play, in time, a significant role in the develop­
ment of accountants' legal liability.
Thus, like the common law of accountants' liability, 
statutory law was to emerge through three stages. First, 
there were the blue sky laws which were adopted by the 
individual states. Second, there were the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193*1.
While these laws have been quite effective, their impact
^^Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp. 878 (Mass.
1973).
^ Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5a 
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (197*1).
53
upon the area of accountants' third party liability has 
been a recent phenomenon. Finally, there were the rules 
and regulations instituted by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. These regulations were initiated in an 
attempt to keep the package of securities related legisla­
tion in step with a constantly evolving financial world.
In time, these national securities regulations were to 
play a significant role in the determination of accountants' 
liability to third party financial statement users.
Summary
Distinct doctrines of accountants' liability to 
third party financial statement users have evolved 
in two separate areas of law. The common law doctrines 
of accountants' liability began to develop as early as 
1842 in England. The interpretation, development and 
modification of these concepts continued for almost one 
hundred years. The statutes which affect the accountant's 
legal liability, on the other hand, did not begin to 
take shape until the beginning of the twentieth century.
Yet, within a period of fifty years, significant federal 
legislation had taken form. This legislation was later 
to play a significant role in the determination of the 
accountant's responsibility for injury suffered by finan­
cial statement users.
While the common law was the major force in the 
early development of accountants' liability, the statutes 
and regulations established in the thirties and forties
were to join the common law as significant factors in 
years to come. Chapter three examines this blending of 
the law, and in doing so, presents a discussion of the 
legal situation which presently confronts the certified 
public accountant.
CHAPTER III
THE CURRENT LEGAL SITUATION PACING 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
The legal concepts of accountants’ third party 
liability have evolved into a most complex set of judicial 
principles. During the last thirty years, many cases 
on the issue of accountants' liability have been decided 
by the courts. Yet, while there is a dearth of decided 
cases, there is no unified body of law defining the 
accountant's responsibilities to third party financial 
statement users. Many of these cases provide doctrines 
which could be universally applied to the area of 
accountants' liability, but most of the doctrines 
established represent the logical conclusion of an 
individual court acting in an individual fact situation. 
Thus, the available decisions provide the accountant with 
only a rudimentary basis upon which to assess his legal 
liability.1
This chapter procedes with a discussion of the 
legal concepts which have been applied by various courts
■̂ -Edward J. Daus, "Accountants' Liability Today,"
New York Certified Public Accountant 37 (November, 1967):  -
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to the area of accountants' civil liability. In accom­
plishing this task a two step approach has been taken. 
First, a discussion of the judiciary's interpretations 
of the professional responsibilities of accountants is 
presented. This section of the chapter concentrates on 
an analysis of the gap which has developed between the 
standards established for the accountant by the courts 
and the standards established for the accountant by 
the accounting profession. Second, a discussion of the 
judiciary's interpretations of the legal responsibilities 
of accountants is presented. This section of the chapter 
concentrates on an analysis of the doctrines of liability 
placement which are currently applicable to the accounting 
profession. This two step approach facilitates an under­
standing of1 the perplexing legal situation which today 
confronts the certified public accountant.
The Public Accountant's Professional 
Responsibilities
As early as 1895, public accountants were recognized 
by the courts to be members of a skilled profession.2 
This judicial recognition brought with it special legal 
treatment, for skilled professionals are usually allowed 
to establish the legal standards of conduct by which 
they will be judged. These legal standards are often the 
same as the standards of conduct set by the profession to
2See In re London and General Bank [1895] 2 Ch.
673; and In re Kingston Cotton Mill Company [1896] 2 Ch. 
279.
govern Its members' activities. This practice of allowing 
professionals to set the standards of conduct by which 
they will be judged has been generally accepted by the 
courts for two specific reasons. First, this legal 
practice was established so that the professionals 
themselves would delineate the rules of conduct by which 
they would customarily abide. Second, this legal practice 
was established to prevent the courts from overburdening 
other professions with liability based on unsophisticated 
judgment.3
The judiciary has accepted this concept of self- 
imposed professional responsibility for many years.
In fact, the concept has become so well entrenched as 
to lead one court to assert that, "Accountants should 
not be held to a standard higher than that recognized 
in their profession. . . . Yet, while several other 
courts were also asserting the validity of this doctrine 
of self-regulation,^ the concept Itself was beginning 
to create some major problems for the public accountant.
The special prlvlledge which the courts had extended 
to the certified public accountant caused the profession
^William L. Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed. (St.
Paul: West Publishing Company, 1971 )> P* 165.
^Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation, 283 
F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
^See Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. 
Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner and Jacobs, 455 F. 2d 847 (4th 
CIr. 1972); and Hochfelder v. Ernst and Ernst, 503 F. 2d 
1100 (7th CIr. 1974).
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as a whole to focus on the audit as the primary source 
of legal problems, and thus, begin to take action which 
would limit the potential for the realization of that 
liability. As such, the profession began to deny any 
responsibility for actions which were beyond the basic audit 
examination. This narrowing of the accountant’s assumed 
responsibility continued to such an extent that the 
profession eventually asserted that the primary responsi­
bility for the fair presentation of financial information 
lies not with the public accountant, but instead, with 
corporate management.^
Many courts have now concluded that this narrowing 
of the public accountant’s assumed responsibilities has 
caused a shift in the priorities of the accounting 
profession. These courts have often reasoned that the 
public accountant no longer seeks to serve the investor 
by presenting fair financial information, but instead, 
seeks to protect himself by meeting certain "esoteric" 
accounting standards. This perceived shift in priorities 
has led many courts to believe that accountants should 
no longer be allowed to determine the standards by which 
their conduct will be judged. As one recent court stated:
Much has been said by the parties about generally 
accepted accounting principles and the proper way 
for an accountant to report real estate transactions.
We think this misses the point. Our inquiry is
^American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
Statement on Auditing Standards (New York: American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1973), PP« 1-2.
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properly focused not on whether Laventhol's report 
satisfied esoteric accounting norms, comprehensible 
only to the initiate, but whether the report fairly 
presents the true financial position . . .  to the 
untutored eye of an ordinary investor.7
Thus, the courts today are not only finding deficiencies
in the way auditors examine financial statements, but
also, are finding deficiencies in certain accounting
principles, and the way those principles are applied to
specific fact situations.® A discussion of some of the
major areas of judicial comment follows.
Disclosure of Subsequent Events
Since World War II, the accounting profession, 
and the services provided by that profession, have 
expanded at a very rapid pace. Today, the average public 
accounting firm supplies to its clients not only the basic 
audit service, but also, supplies tax and management 
advisory services. While these additional service areas 
provide the accountant with an opportunity to develop 
a closer relationship with the client, they also provide 
an opportunity to obtain further information concerning 
the financial condition of the client firm. Such 
subsequently acquired information can have a significant 
effect on the previously expressed opinion of the public
7Hertzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath and 
Horwath, 1974 CCH Federal Security Law Reports, par.94574.
®Henry B. Relling and Russel A. Taussig, "Recent 
Liability Cases— Implications for Accountants," Journal 
of Accountancy 130 (September, 1970):4l.
accountant, the action taken by a potential investor 
and the legal liability of that accountant to that 
investor. The extent of this potential liability has 
been a major question in the past few years.
Initially, the accounting profession argued that 
the report issued by a certified public accountant repre 
sented the opinion of that accountant on the fairness of 
a set of financial statements as of the end of the 
audit examination. Therefore, If the accountant had 
complied with accepted auditing standards In the per­
formance of his examination, and if the accountant's 
opinion had been advanced in good faith, no legal 
liability could arise out of that particular engagement. 
Even if a subsequent event, or discovery, should change 
the auditor’s opinion at some later date, the profession 
reasoned that there was no need to disclose this new 
information for it had no significance in relation to 
the dated audit opinion. This theory of professional 
responsibility was to be eventually challenged by the 
judiciary.
Two significant, but isolated, events served as 
a prelude to a final decision on the responsibility of 
public accountants for the disclosure of subsequently 
acquired information. First, in 1883, the U. S. Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that one party to a 
contract has a duty to correct any misapprehensions 
which were affecting the actions of the other party to
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the contract.^ Second, the Securities Act of 1933 
imposed upon the accountant a duty to disclose all 
information obtained subsequent to the audit, and prior 
to the effective date of the registration statement.10 
While neither of these events applied to the general 
accountant-third party relationship, they did indicate 
a trend on the part of the law-making bodies. This trend 
toward the imposition of a duty to disclose subsequent 
events was to be the main thrust of the law for many 
years,11 but the final decision was not to come until 
1967.
In the case of Fischer v. Kletz12 (Fischer) the 
court fashioned a rule which drew heavily from those 
earlier situations. It was here that the court ruled 
that where there exists reason to believe that people 
are continuing to rely on a representation which is not 
true, the individual responsible for the representation 
must see that it is corrected.1  ̂ The court justified
^Loewer v. Harris, 57 F. 368 (2nd Cir. 1893).
10In the Matter of Charles A. Howard, E. Harold 
DeNoyelles, Elmer W. Maher, William B. Atwater, 1 SEC 6 
(1934).
■^William L. Prosser, Law of Torts. 2nd ed. (St.
Paul: West Publishing Company, 1955), p . 535.
12Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
■^Theodore Sonde, "The Responsibility of Professionals 
Under the Federal Securities Laws— Some Observations," 
Northwestern University Law Review 68 (March-April, 1973): 
17-18.
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the establishment of such a rule of professional responsi­
bility by saying:
I can see no reason why this duty to disclose should 
not be imposed upon an accounting firm which makes 
a representation it knows will be relied upon by 
investors. To be sure, certification of a financial 
statement does not create a formal business relation­
ship between the accountant who certified and the 
individual who relied upon the certificate for invest­
ment purposes. The act of certification, however 
is similar in its effect to a representation made in 
a business transaction: both supply information
which is materially and justifiably relied upon by 
individuals for decisional purposes. Viewed in this 
context of the impact of nondisclosure on the injured 
party, it is difficult to conceive that a distinction 
between accountants and parties to a business 
transaction is warranted. The elements of 'good 
faith and common honesty' which govern the businessman 
should also apply to the statutory 'independent 
public accountant'.1^
Thus, an accountant who makes a representation which he
knows will be relied upon by third parties is under a
duty to disclose to those third parties any information
obtained subsequent to the initial representation.^5
This was to be the first inroad into the accountant's
right to establish the professional standards by which he
would be judged— by no means was it to be the last.
Detection of Insider Fraud 
The rapid growth of the economic sector produced 
two basic problems for the public accounting profession.
■^Fischer.
■^J. Michael Murphy, "Notes and Comments: Accounts
and Accounting: The Responsibilities of CPA's Imposed
by Law and by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants," Oklahoma Law Review 26 (August, 1973)*.388.
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First, the growth of corporate entities made it virtually 
Impossible for the public accountant to perform a com­
plete examination of the financial records of most 
corporations. If the accounting profession as a whole 
were to require a complete examination of all financial 
records, the result would almost certainly be audit 
costs which are prohibitive to most corporate entities. 
Second, the growth of corporate entities produced an 
atmosphere more conducive to insider fraud. Since the 
public accountant could not examine all financial transac­
tions, a group of employees could easily subvert the
audit examination, and thus, defraud the corporation
1 6and the investing public.
With these problems contributing to serious 
deficiencies in the traditional audit procedures, the 
public accountant was forced to rely on tests, samples 
and internal control as the basis for the expression of 
his opinion. The accountant soon realized that this 
shift in audit procedures made it impossible to guarantee 
the detection of all corporate fraud. This realization 
was expressed in the profession’s auditing standards in 
the following manner:
In making the ordinary examination, the 
independent auditor is aware of the possibility that 
fraud may exist. Financial statements may be misstated 
as the result of defalcations and similar irregu­
larities, or deliberate misrepresentation by
^Jerry D. Trites and Barry M. Grant, "Set the 
Watchdog Free," Chartered Accountant Magazine 106 
(January, 1975):2 k .
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management, or both. The auditor recognizes that 
fraud, if sufficiently material, may affect his 
opinion on the financial statements, and his examina­
tion, made in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards, gives consideration to this 
possibility. However, the ordinary examination 
directed to the expression of an opinion on financial 
statements is not primarily or specifically designed, 
and cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations 
and other similar irregularities, although their 
discovery may result. Similarly, although the 
discovery of deliberate misrepresentation by manage­
ment is usually more closely associated with the 
objective of the ordinary examination, such examina­
tion cannot be relied upon to assure its discovery. 
The responsibility of the independent auditor for 
failure to detect fraud . . . arises only when such 
failure clearly results from failure to comply 
with generally accepted auditing standards.17
While the accounting profession has denied any 
responsibility for the detection of corporate fraud, 
third parties, and certain courts, have argued that the 
imposition of such a responsibility upon the profession 
is not unwarranted. These certain courts were to eventu­
ally use Section 10(b), and particularly Rule 10b-5, of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as the means for 
imposing civil liability for failure to detect corporate 
fraud upon the public accounting profession.
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the act provide 
a broad remedy for persons injured by fraudulent acts 
perpetrated in the purchase or sale of securities.
Since these provisions only relate to activities "in 
connection with the sale or purchase of securities", 
accountants have always felt that they could not be
^American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
pp. 2-3.
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applied to the members of their profession.-1-® Yet,
several recent court decisions have suggested that
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can be applied to certified
public accountants when certain prerequisite conditions
are present. As one recent court pointed out:
The purpose of the financial statements is to inform 
the man on the street and the underlying policy of 
the Securities and Exchange Acts and of Rule 10b-5 
is to assure that he can have truthful information 
in buying securities regardless of the intended 
victim of the fraud. Moreover, the defendants have 
set themselves up to be independent certified 
public auditors. As such, they have assumed a pecul­
iar relationship with the investing public. As 
accountants, the defendants clearly cannot be immu­
nized from suit.19
In general, the courts have advanced five conditions 
which must be present before an accountant will be held 
liable for aiding and abetting a corporate securities 
fraud. First, it must be demonstrated that the accountant 
had a duty to inquire into the financial position of 
the firm. Second, it must be proven that the plaintiff 
was a beneficiary of this duty of inquiry. Third, it 
must be shown that the accountant was guilty of a breach 
of that duty of inquiry. Fourth, it must be demonstrated 
that the accountant breached a concomitant duty of 
disclosure. Finally, it must be proven that adequate
1 8Denzil Y. Causey, Jr., "Foreseeability as a 
Determinant of Audit Responsibility," The Accounting 
Review 47 (April, 1973):263.
■^Drake v. Thor Power Tool Company, 282 F. Supp. 
94 (N.D. 111. 1967).
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inquiry on the part of the accountant would have uncovered 
the fraud.20
To prove the existence of these five specific 
conditions, the third party plaintiff need not prove 
that the accountant acted in a fraudulent manner, or 
even that the accountant benefited from the fraud.
Instead, the courts have held that it is sufficient to 
show that an aider and abettor knew, or should have known, 
that the actions of the primary parties (the purchasers 
or sellers of the securities) were being carried out 
in violation of Rule 10b-5. Therefore, an accountant 
can be charged with aiding and abetting a 10b-5 violation 
if he was negligent in the performance of his audit, and 
if this negligence resulted in the accountant's failure 
to detect that violation.21
It was this charge of aiding and abetting a 
Rule 10b-5 violation which produced a serious difference 
in the accounting standards adhered to by the profession 
and those adhered to by the courts. As yet, the extent 
of this difference has not been determined, but, fortu­
nately for the accounting profession, the Supreme Court 
has agreed to define the limits of the accountant's 
liability for the detection of fraud sometime during the
^Hoehfelder.
2lArnold S. Jacobs, The Impact of Rule 10b-5 
(New York: Clark Boardman Company, 197^)» P • 2-70.
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1975 Winter Session.22 Only after such an ultimate legal 
definition is attained, will the accounting profession 
be able to promulgate professional standards which 
conform to the legal standards established by the courts.
Preparation of Unaudited Financial 
Statements
Another area in which there are major differences 
between the professional standards established by 
accounting, and those established by the courts, is the 
area of legal responsibility for the preparation of 
unaudited financial statements. With regard to this 
area of professional activity, the public accounting 
profession has argued that unaudited financial statements 
are not the subject of any specific examination processes, 
and therefore, cannot be the potential source of any 
third party legal responsibility.23 On the other hand, 
several recent courts have asserted different interpre­
tations of both the accountant's professional duties 
and legal responsibilities when dealing with these unau­
dited financial statements.
In the case of 1136 Tenants Corporation v. Max 
Rothenberg and Company2** (1136 Tenants) the court was
22,lTop Court Will Define When an Auditor is Liable 
for Client's Securities Violation," Wa.ll Street Journal,
15 April 1975, p. 4.
2^Murphy, p. 385*
241136 Tenants Corporation v. Max Rothenberg and 
Company, 319 N.Y.S. 2d 1007 (1971).
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presented with its first opportunity to comment on 
the liability of public accountants for negligence in 
the preparation of unaudited statements. It was also 
here, that the court determined that such third party 
liability does exist. The New York Court reasoned 
that theories of negligence liability could be applied 
in such a manner as to require a public accountant 
to act with reasonable care when dealing with any type 
of financial representation. The court in 1136 Tenants 
further reasoned that since negligence on the part 
of the accountant will contribute to third party injury 
in both audited and unaudited situations, a profes­
sional’s duty to third party statement users exists
in either situation.25
While the decision advanced by the 1136 Tenants 
Court did have a major impact upon the accounting 
profession, the reasoning that the court used in 
arriving at that decision has had a more significant 
impact upon the professional standards of public 
accountants. The court in 1136 Tenants directly 
contradicted traditional accounting standards by arguing 
that the accountant has an obligation to perform certain 
techniques of verification to determine the fairness 
of financial representations, even when that accountant 
is dealing with a simple set of unaudited financial
25Murphy, p. 388.
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statements. One later court Interpreted this basic
contradiction by saying:
Even when performing an unaudited write-up, an 
accountant is under a duty to undertake at least 
a minimal investigation into the figures supplied 
to him. He is not free to disregard suspicious circumstances.26
Yet, the accounting profession reacted to this 
newest intrusion by the courts with arguments, instaed 
of their usual acquiescence. Accountants have advanced 
several arguments in an attempt to discredit the 11.36 
Tenants Decision. First, the accounting profession has 
argued that the fee charged by Rothenberg for his 
services could not have possibly compensated him for the 
performance of any verification processes. Second, the 
accounting profession has argued that it is highly 
unlikely that Riker (both the embezzler and employer of 
Rothenberg) would have hired someone to specifically 
uncover his fraudulent activities. Finally, and most 
importantly, the accounting profession has argued that 
all of the financial statements issued by the accountants 
contained legends which revealed the inherent lack of 
verification and examination.2? Thus, the accounting
^Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 267 (Oreg.
1973).
27Michael J. Whaling, "Liability of Certified 
Public Accountants— Unaudited Financial Statements-—  
Certified Public Accountants Are Liable for Negligence 
in Preparation of Unaudited Statements," Notre Dame 
Lawyer 48 (December, 1972):495.
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profession has contended that the basis for the decision 
in 1136 Tenants was totally unfounded.
Prior to the 1136 Tenants Decision, certified 
public accountants were held liable for negligence only 
when an opinion was issued as the result of an audit 
examination. While the scope of the accountant’s 
liability for audited financial statements has expanded 
over the years, the courts had not previously extended 
such legal liability to other areas of accounting 
services.2® Yet, in spite of the arguments of the 
accounting profession, the 1136 Tenants Decision has 
made such an extension. It would seem that this case 
shall remain as a major legal precedent, at least until 
another court, acting in a similar situation, sees fit 
to overrule this New York Decision.^
Future Trends 
While the attest function of the certified public 
accountant has been traditionally limited to the expression 
of an opinion on a set of audited financial statements, 
there has been a great amount of recent discussion 
concerning an expansion of the scope of the public 
accountant’s examination. Yet, the recent court decisions 
which have held accountants responsible for activities
28Ibid.
2^Norman J. Elliot, "Another View.of the 1136 
Tenants’ Corporation Case," Certified Public Accountant 
Journal 42 (December, 1972):1005-
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beyond the limits of their basic professional standards 
have caused most accountants to believe that the risks 
involved in such an expansion of their work would far out­
weigh any benefits which would be derived. This fear on 
the part of the accounting profession is not based upon 
pure speculation, but instead, is the result of some recent 
decisions which have been promulgated by the courts.
One area of potential audit expansion is that of 
attesting to the accuracy of financial forecasts. Most 
financial analysts feel that projections of a firm's 
future economic performance are necessary for well informed 
investor decisions. Furthermore, these analysts feel 
that if such projections should be presented, some 
type of independent verification would be necessary.
The certified public accountant is in a perfect position 
to supply this independent verification. Yet, most 
members of the accounting profession are of the opinion 
that if examinations of financial forecasts are to become 
an inherent part of the audit function, there must be 
some special legal treatment associated with these pro­
jected figures. Basically, professionals argue that 
since financial forecasts are so speculative, there 
should be no legal responsibility for their certifica­
tion. 30 Unfortunately for public accountants, the courts
^Philip E. Fess and Spencer J. Martin, "Company 
Forecasts and the Independent Auditor’s Inexorable 
Involvement," Certified Public Accountant Journal 43 
(October, 1973):873. ’
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have not seen fit to agree with this line of argumenta­
tion. Instead, the courts have held that projected 
financial information constitutes a material fact under 
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission.31 
Therefore, it would seem that accountants could be held 
liable for certain failures in the examination of fore­
casted financial information.
A second area of potential audit expansion lies 
in the preparation of current value financial state­
ments. Here again, the accounting profession argues 
that since current value statements are so indefinite, 
there must be special legal treatment afforded those 
who issue them. Yet, the courts, again, have taken a 
contradictory approach to the problem. In several 
recent decisions, the courts have ruled that current 
value financial information is a material fact.32 There­
fore, it would again seem that accountants shall be 
held legally responsible to third party financial state­
ment users for failure to exercise due care in the 
examination of current value financial statements.
The problems associated with the appearance of 
the professional man in the courts have always been great.
^Howard J. Trienens and Daniel U. Smith, "Legal 
Implications of Current Value Accounting," Financial 
Executive 40 (September, 1974):48.
3^See Grestle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Incorporated,
298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); and Speed v. Trans- 
america Corporation, 99 F. Supp. 808 (Dela. 1951).
Initially, the courts sought to reduce these problems 
be allowing skilled professions to establish the standards 
by which their members would be judged. Through this 
mechanism, the courts assured professionals that the 
standards by which they would be governed in a court of 
law would be the same as those by which they would be 
governed in the performance of their business activities. 
Unfortunately for the accounting profession, some courts 
have now discarded this once universally accepted legal 
doctrine. Various courts, commenting on various business 
situations, have questioned the reasonableness of certain 
generally accepted auditing standards. These recent 
judicial comments have contributed greatly to the exis­
tence of a gap between the legal standards by which an 
accountant will be judged and the professional standards 
by which an accountant will act.
The Courts1 Doctrines of Liability Placement
The doctrines of liability placement which are 
today used in determining the accountant’s liability to 
third party statement users have evolved over a period 
of more than one hundred years. Yet, even this long 
period of evolutionary development has not produced a 
concept of liability placement which is generally accepted 
by all courts. While the members of the judiciary have 
agreed that two factors— the degree of care exercised 
by the accountant, and the relationship which existed 
between the accountant and third party— enter into the
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placement of civil liability, the courts have not estab­
lished a general relationship between these two factors 
and the imposition of legal liability. This section of 
this chapter presents an analysis of the most commonly 
accepted doctrines of liability placement. In so doing, 
it is intended that an insight into the legal situation 
which presently confronts the certified public accountant 
will be gained.
Liability for Pure Fraud 
Legal liability to third party financial statement 
users for fraud, or intentional deceit, is the oldest 
of the concepts of liability placement which have been 
applied to members of the public accounting profession. 
Furthermore, the concept of legal responsibility for 
intentional deceit is the only concept of liability 
placement which has been universally accepted by the 
courts. With almost no exception, the American Courts 
today hold that an individual who makes a fraudulent 
misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law is 
liable for the injury suffered by individuals who have 
relied upon the misrepresentation.33 Therefore, an 
accountant who intentionally deceives the investing 
public will be held liable to all of the members of the 
general public who were injured due to that accountant’s 
deceit.
^American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law 
of Torts (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1934), p. 59•
While the courts have accepted a charge of fraudu­
lent misrepresentation as a valid basis for actions 
against the certified public accountant, they have 
generally required that certain underlying conditions 
be met before an injured third party will be granted 
recovery. The first of the underlying requirements of 
an action based in pure fraud is that of scienter, or 
knowledge. If the accountant is to be charged with 
fraudulent misrepresentation, the third party plaintiff 
has an obligation to prove that the accountant actually 
knew that his representation was false. if on the 
other hand, the accountant is not aware of the fact that 
he is deceiving the public, he cannot be charged with 
pure fraud, and instead, must be charged with some other, 
less actionable, tort.
A second prerequisite to any third party action 
based on a charge of fraudulent misrepresentation is that 
of intent. An accountant who makes a fraudulent misrepre­
sentation is liable only to those parties whose action 
he intended to influence. While this element of intent 
would seem to place a severe limitation on third party 
recovery, the limitation is only minor due to several 
liberalizations of the law. First, most courts will 
rule that an individual intends a particular result to 
occur, if the individual either acts in a way which will
3^William L. Prosser, "Misrepresentation and Third 
Parties," Vanderbilt Law Review 19 (March, 1966):233-
cause the result to occur, or acts under the belief 
that there is substantial certainty that the result 
will occur. Therefore, accountants are not only liable 
for the occurrence of one particular result, but also, 
are held responsible for any number of substantially 
similar results which might eventually occur. Second, 
the intent of an accountant’s actions is not limited 
to its effect on one individual, but instead, extends 
to many different groups of individuals. A fraudulent 
misrepresentation made with the intent of inducing more 
than one person, or group of persons, to act, subjects 
the maker to liability to any of those individuals.35 
Therefore, a certified public accountant who makes a 
fraudulent misrepresentation is liable to all those 
who he should have reasonably foreseen as being injured
by his deceit.36
The final prerequisite to a third party action 
based on a charge of fraudulent misrepresentation is 
that of reliance. The third party plaintiff must be 
able to prove that he both relied upon the fraudulent 
misrepresentation of the accountant, and that this 
reliance was justified. For a third party to prove 
reliance on a financial representation, that third party
^American Law Institute, pp. 71-74.
-^Rusch Factors, Incorporated v. Levin, 284 F. 
Supp. 85 (R.I. 1968).
77
need only show that the financial representation had 
a significant impact upon his final course of action.37 
On the other hand, proving that this reliance was justified
is not quite so easy.
To prove that his reliance was justifiable, the 
third party must prove two independent facts. First, 
the third party plaintiff must be able to prove that 
the fact misrepresented by the public accountant was a 
material one. To accomplish this task, the third party 
must show that the misrepresented fact was one to which 
a reasonable man would attach significance. Second, 
the third party plaintiff must show that he had no 
knowledge as to the falsity of the misrepresentation.
If the third party either knew, or should have known,
of the false nature of the representation, his reliance
was not justifiable, and therefore, liability for 
fraudulent misrepresentation cannot e x i s t . 38
When a third party financial statement user is 
capable of proving scienter, intent and reliance, the 
courts will hold accountants liable for fraudulent mis­
representation. Yet, while pure fraud has become an 
accepted basis for legal action, the difficulty involved 
in proving such a charge has made such actions a rarity.39
37American Law Institute, p. 106.
33ibid., pp. 84-86.
■ ^ J o s e p h  p .  Dawson, "Auditors’ Third Party Liability: 
An Ill-Considered Extension of the Law," Washington Law 
Review 46 (1971):676.
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Therefore, the courts have turned to some more liberal 
doctrines of liability placement when dealing with 
members of the public accounting profession.
Liability for Gross Negligence 
While the traditional third party action for 
deceit was based in fraud, the courts soon realized 
that the requirements of scienter, intent and reliance 
were overly strict in relation to the situation with 
which they were dealing. As the attitude of the courts 
began to shift toward a more favorable view of third 
party litigation, the idea of gross negligence as an 
inference of fraud began to seep into the law of account­
ants' liability.1*® This idea of gross negligence as a 
replacement for certain of the fraud requirements was 
to represent a significant expansion of the law of fraudu­
lent misrepresentation.
Gross negligence, or constructive fraud, consists 
of a false representation which induces a third party 
to take action detrimental to his well b e i n g . W h i l e  
a charge of pure fraud would require definite proof of 
the existence of each of the prerequisite factors, a 
charge of gross negligence requires proof of only a
^Arthur J. Marinelli, Jr., "The Expanding Scope 
of Accountants' Liability to Third Parties," Case 
Western Reserve Law Review 23 (November, 1971):ll6.
in R. James Gormley, "Accountants' Professional 
Liability— A Ten Year Review," Business Lawyer 29 (July, 
197*0 :1207.
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false representation on the part of the defendant and 
justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff. Thus, 
without actually proving the existence of pure fraud, 
a third party plaintiff may provide evidence which 
sustains a charge of gross negligence, and therefore, 
may be used by a jury to infer fraud on the part of a 
certified public accountant.
In order to prove that such a false, or grossly 
negligent, misrepresentation has been made by the account­
ant, the third party statement user needs only to show 
that the public accountant had no factual basis upon 
which to make his representation. Since the opinion 
of the accountant implies that he has made a firm factual 
examination of the financial records of a particular 
company, a substantially wrong representation which 
indicates that the accountant has made no such factual 
examination is sufficient to prove the gross negligence, 
and possible fraud, of that certified public accountant.^2 
As one recent court stated:
To be actionable deceit, the representation 
need not be made with knowledge of actual falsity, 
but need only be an ’assertion, as a fact, of that 
which is not true, by one who has no reasonable 
ground for believing it to be true . . .’43
Through the use of this gross negligence concept, 
the courts developed two means by which a jury can
h pAmerican Law Institute, p. 65.
^Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P. 2d 15 (Calif. 1954).
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conclude that the activity of a public accountant was 
fraudulent. Unfortunately, this attempt on the part 
of the judiciary to provide a more liberal approach to 
the issue of fraudulent conduct has created a great 
deal of confusion. The existence of these two doctrines 
of liability placement has only contributed to the sub­
stantial amount of overlap which exists between the legal 
concepts of pure fraud and simple negligence.^
Liability for Negligence— The Privity Concept 
Almost all of the court jurisdictions in the 
United States have accepted both the concept of pure 
fraud and the idea of gross negligence as an inference 
of fraud as viable forms of third party legal action.
Yet, the judiciary is a great deal less consistent in 
its interpretation of the law of accountants' third 
party liability when the accountant is guilty of nothing 
more than simple negligence. Although the courts have 
commonly agreed that simple negligence on the part of 
the accountant consists of a failure to perform a service, 
or make a report, with the due care commonly exercised 
by accountants and required by professional standards,^5 
the courts have been quite inconsistent in their applica­
tion of this concept. This inconsistency results from
^Shatterproof Glass Corporation v. James, 466 S.W. 
873 (Tex. App. 1971).
^Qormley, p. 1206.
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the insertion of another factor into the issue of liability 
placement. Beyond determining whether the accountant 
is actually guilty of negligence in the performance 
of his services, the courts have also attempted to 
determine whether the relationship existent between 
the third party and the public accountant is sufficient 
to require the accountant to exercise that duty of 
due c a r e . T h i s  second requirement has resulted in the 
proliferation of several doctrines of liability placement, 
none of which is generally accepted by all courts.
In 1931, Justice Cardozo, rendering the decision 
of the court in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven 
and C o m p a n y ^7 (Ultramares), halted what he had termed 
"the assault upon the citadel of privity". Cardozo took 
this step in an attempt to shield the accounting pro­
fession from the potentially crushing burden of third 
party liability for simple negligence. It has been 
this same prerequisite of privity of contract which has 
successfully insulated the accountant from most third
iiQparty legal action. 7
^Thomas W. Hill, Jr. "The Public Accountants1 
Legal Liability to Clients and Others," New York 
Certified Public Accountant 38 (January, 1968):23.
^Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven and 
Company, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 44l (1931).
lipProsser, p. 239-
^Reiling, p. 40.
While the attack upon the citadel of privity 
did continue to move forward on some legal fronts, the 
area of liability in which the public accountant is most 
primarily involved (i.e., that of liability for the 
pecuniary losses suffered by third parties) is heavily 
protected. By i960, the requirement of the existence 
of a contractual relationship between parties had been 
all but discarded by the courts in dealing with cases of 
physical injury;^ yet, where the injury suffered by 
the third party was pecuniary in nature, the courts 
were not so willing to abandon privity of contract in 
favor of third party recovery.^
Today, many courts automatically apply Cardozo’s 
prerequisite of a relationship equivalent to privity of 
contract when dealing with suits instituted by third 
parties who have suffered pecuniary loss due to the 
ordinary negligence of others. ^  Therefore, it would 
seem that where the privity doctrine is followed, an 
accountant will noi be held liable to a third party for
5°Prosser, p. 232.
^Richard L. Miller, "Public Accountants and 
Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party," Notre Dame
Lawyer 47 (Fall, 1972) :593.
5^See MacNerland v. Barnes, 199 S.E. 2d 564 (Ga. 
App. 1973); and Stephens Industries, Incorporated v. 
Haskins and Sells, 438 F. 2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971); and 
Investment Corporation of Florida v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 
291 (Fla. App. 1968); and Duro Sportswear, Incorporated 
Cogen, 131 N.Y.S. 20 (1954); and Chandler v. Chrane, 
Christmas and Company [1951] 2 K.B. 164.
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negligent misrepresentation. While this doctrine 
represents the state of the law in many court jurisdic­
tions, there have been indications that the assault upon
C Othe citadel has not been completely abandoned.
Liability for Negligence— The 
Primary Benefit Rule
While many American Courts were applying the 
New York Rule of privity of contract to all situations 
involving third parties and negligent public accountants, 
other courts, both American and English, were taking a 
second look at the all encompassing Ultramares Decision. 
This second look at the decision rendered by Cardozo 
in Ultramares produced some significant liberalizations 
in the law of negligent misrepresentation.
When reinterpreting the Ultramares Decision, 
several courts realized that the determination of whether 
or not a defendant in a specific case should be held 
liable to third parties not in privity of contract is 
a matter of policy, and thus, involves the balancing of 
many legal and social factors. These factors include 
such things as: the extent to which the representation
was intended to influence the third party plaintiff, 
the foreseeability of the harm which the third party 
plaintiff suffered, the degree to which the injury suffered 
by the third party plaintiff was certain and the closeness
^Nicholas D. Tellie, "Auditor's Liability to 
Third Parties," Loyola Law Review 17 (1970-1971):357.
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of the connection between the defendant’s negligence and 
the injury suffered by the third party p l a i n t i f f . 5 ^
This careful balancing process has resulted in an expanded 
doctrine of accountants’ third party liability which has 
been termed the primary benefit rule.
While the primary benefit rule was actually first 
espoused by the New York Court in Glanzer v. Shepard^5 
(Glanzer), the rule itself remained relatively dormant 
for almost fifty years. Then, in several different 
court decisions, both the American and English Judiciaries 
began to reassert this doctrine of liability placement 
as a means of circumventing Justice Cardozo's prerequisite 
of privity of contract. This process of circumvention 
was to represent a serious move toward the final abandon­
ment of privity as a requirement in cases involving 
negligent misrepresentation.
The process of reasserting the primary benefit 
rule began in the English Case of Hedley Bryne and Company 
v. Heller and Partners-^ (Hedley Bryne). It was in this 
case that the English Court recognized the right of an 
injured third party to recover pecuniary damages which 
were caused by the negligent misrepresentation of another.
^Aluma Kraft Manufacturing Company v. Elmer Pox 
and Company, 493 S.W. 2d 378 (Mo. App. 1973).
55Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
-^Hedley Bryne and Company v. Heller and Partners 
[1964] 2 A .C. 465.
The court argued that this right of recovery should be 
granted whenever a certain "special relationship" existed 
between the parties. While the English Court left the 
exact limits of this special relationship undefined, 
it would seem that the public accountant would often 
find such a relationship existing between himself and 
a third party financial statement u s e r . 57
The American Courts were quick to apply the doctrine 
of primary benefit to cases involving certified public 
accountants and third party financial statement users.
The Rhode Island Court based its decision in Rusch 
Factors v. Levin^S (Rusch Factors) on this early common 
law doctrine. In so doing, the Rusch Factors Court 
held that accountants did owe a duty to exercise due 
care to those third parties who are specifically foreseen, 
and known, by the public accountant. One year later, 
the Iowa Court in the case of Ryan v. Kanne-^ (Ryan) 
expressed this same sentiment by saying:
This being a case of first impression in Iowa, 
we are disposed to reject the rule that third parties 
not in privity of contract or in a fiduciary relation­
ship are always barred from recovery for negligence 
of the party issuing the instrument upon which the 
third party relies, to his detriment. It is unneces­
sary at this time to determine whether the rule of 
no liability should be relaxed to all foreseeable
^Leonard Mentzer, "Accountant's Common Law Liability 
to Third Persons for Misrepresentation," California Law 
Review 57 (1969):283.
5®Rusch Factors.
59Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W. 2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
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persons who may rely upon the report, but we do 
hold It should be relaxed to those who are actually 
known to the author as prospective users of the 
report . . .
Thus, it would seem, that certain jurisdictions 
recognize an accountant to be legally responsible for 
pecuniary losses suffered by third party financial state­
ment users and caused by the negligent misrepresentation 
of the public accountant. Such liability shall be 
recognized, even though there is an absence of privity 
of contract, if the financial statement user is specifi­
cally known to the negligent accountant.6l
Liability for Negligence— The 
Foreseen Class Concept
Most of the jurisdictions which have accepted the 
primary benefit rule as a means of liability placement 
have also found that the rule has inherent in it a 
severe limitation as to the number of individuals who 
will be allowed a means of loss recovery. In an attempt 
to lessen this limiting factor, many of these liberal 
courts have introduced the idea of the foreseen class 
to the area of accountants' third party liability.^2 
Under such a concept of liability placement, the account­
ant would not only be held responsible to those individuals
6oIbid.
6lIbid.
62see Rhode Island; and Rusch Factors; and Shatter­
proof Glass; and Ryan.
who are specifically foreseen, but would also be legally 
responsible to all members of any class of individuals 
which is specifically foreseen by the accountant.
In this way, the courts have expanded the number of third 
parties that could recover pecuniary damages suffered 
due to the negligent misrepresentation of the public 
accountant.^3 Thus, if the public accountant knows 
that his financial representation will be used by his 
client for a specific purpose, and further, if the account­
ant realizes that a specific class of persons will rely 
upon his financial representation in fulfilling that 
purpose, the accountant will be held liable for the 
damages suffered by any member of that class due to their 
reliance on his financial misrepresentation. This concept 
of liability placement provides a substantial expansion 
of the accountant's third party responsibility, while
not yet embracing the indeterminate liability which was\
once so feared.
Although many courts have disregarded privity of 
contract, and thus, held professionals liable for the 
pecuniary losses of third parties, accountants have not 
been totally stripped of the protection which was once 
provided them. While some courts do render decisions, 
and express dicta, contrary to Cardozo's New York Rule,
63»Torts: Accountant Liable to Third Party for
Negligent Misrepresentation," Minnesota Law Review 53 
(June, 1969):1383•
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no court has ever attempted to overrule the Ultramares 
Decision. More Importantly, there is no indication that 
any court will attempt to do so in the near future.^
Rusch Factors provides an example of this combina­
tion of judicial attitude and action. While the Rusch 
Factors Court disagreed with the reasoning used to arrive 
at the New York Rule of privity, the Rusch Factors 
Court made careful efforts to distinguish, and not 
overrule, Ultramares.^5 in distinguishing the cases, 
and thus, accepting the primary benefit rule, the Rusch 
Factors Court said:
This Court need not, however, hold that the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court would overrule the Ultramares 
decision if presented with the opportunity, for the 
case at bar is quantitatively distinguishable from 
Ultramares.
It would seem that, depending upon the jurisdiction, 
the primary benefit rule, the foreseen class concept or 
the prerequisite of privity of contract will be applied 
by the courts to determine the liability of negligent 
accountants to third party financial statement users.
Liability for Negligence— The 
Foreseeability Concept
The current, and more liberal, trend of legal 
thought seems to run contrary to the idea of privity of
^Reiling.
^Thomas F. Rogers, "Accounting— Is Liability for 
Ordinary Negligence Just Around the Corner?," Boston 
University Law Review 49 (Winter, 1969):194.
^Rusch Factors.
contract and the entire Ultramares Decision. Perhaps 
this judicial trend is due to a general breakdown in the 
privity doctrine in other areas of the law; or, perhaps 
this trend is due to a recognition of accounting as 
a public service. No matter what the reason, the decline 
of the prerequisite of privity of contract has precipitated 
a substantial expansion of the accountant's legal liability 
to third party financial statement users. ^
One of the means by which the courts could implement 
this expanded liability is through the acceptance of 
reasonable foreseeability as the guide to liability place­
ment. Under such a doctrine of liability placement, 
the negligent accountant would be legally responsible 
to all of those third parties which he should have 
reasonably expected to rely on his financial representa­
tion.^ This concept of liability placement would 
facilitate the most significant expansion of the account­
ant's liability to third party statement users.
The concept of reasonable foreseeability, like 
the primary benefit rule, is not new in origin. In fact, 
it was Justice Cardozo, expressing the decision of the 
New York Court in Palsgraf v. Long Island R a i l r o a d * ^  
(Palsgraf), who first mentioned the concept as a viable
^^Murphy, p. 387.
^Shatterproof Glass.
69palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 248 N.Y. 339>
162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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means of liability placement. As Cardozo said, "The 
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be 
obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another 
or others within the range of a p p r e h e n s i o n . It 
would seem that Cardozo felt that the foreseeability of 
the risk determined the extent of the relationship 
between parties, and thus, the concomitant liability.
While no American Court has yet applied the standard 
of reasonable foreseeability to the public accountant- 
third party relationship,71 other courts, in cases dealing 
with members of other skilled professions, have sought 
to embrace such a concept of liability placement.72
Yet, beyond this basic acceptance in other areas 
of the law of negligence, there are two factors confronting 
the public accounting profession which Indicate the 
significance of the reasonable foreseeability concept. 
First, the Securities Act of 1933 relies on the concept 
of foreseeability in defining the limits of its civil 
liability. Section 11 of the act imposes liability upon 
public accountants for negligence in the preparation 
of a registration statement. This liability extends to
70lbid.
71"Torts— Negligence— Accountant Held Liable to 
a Third Party Not in Privity," The University of Kansas 
Law Review 22 (Winter, 197^0:295.
7^See LIcata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 78, 225 
A. 2d 28 (1966).
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all parties who purchase securities covered by that 
registration statement.73 Thus, under this legislation,- 
the accountant is liable to every member of this fore­
seeable class. Second, many courts have indicated a 
favorable attitude toward the doctrine of foreseeability 
when dealing with accountants' common law liability 
to third parties.7^ it would therefore seem that the 
courts of several jurisdictions will be willing to accept 
a doctrine of reasonable foreseeability as a means of 
liability placement if confronted with a particular 
accountant-third party situation.
The statutory and common laws of accountants' third 
party liability provide the courts with six concepts of 
liability placement from which to choose. While the selec­
tion of a particular doctrine is the result of a careful 
balancing process, the courts have indicated a judicial 
attitude toward expansion of the accountant's third party 
liability. This attitude toward expansion, when combined 
with the variety of legal doctrines, confronts the public 
accountant with a most confusing legal situation.
Summary
The liability of public accountants to third 
party financial statement users represents a most
73Securitles Act of 1933, U.S. Code, Title 15, 
sec. 77(k) (1970).
7**See Shatterproof Glass; and Ryan.
perplexing area of the law. The perplexing nature of 
this area is the result of a combination of two factors. 
First, the judiciary has introduced an element of uncer­
tainty into this area of the law by establishing legal 
principles of professional responsibility which differ 
substantially from the standards which the accounting 
profession has established to regulate the activities 
of its members. This gap between professional and legal 
standards has often stultified the profession in its 
attempts to keep pace with the economic needs of society. 
Second, the judiciary has introduced an element of uncer­
tainty into this area of the law by establishing six 
different doctrines of liability placement which can be 
applied to the accountant-third party relationship. These 
doctrines have made it virtually impossible for the public 
accountant to determine the scope of his third party 
liability. In general, it would seem that the public 
accounting and legal professions are today faced with 
the problem of developing a workable doctrine of account­
ants third party liability. Chapters four and five attempt 
to explore, and eventually provide a solution to, this 
problem.
CHAPTER IV
THE CASE FOR EXTENDED ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY
Today, a careful balancing process is inherent 
in the determination of the public accountant’s civil 
liability to third party financial statement users (see 
chapter three). This careful balancing not only involves 
a search for legal doctrines which will introduce equity 
and certainty into the law, but also, involves a search 
for a full understanding of the potential nonlegal impact 
of each of those doctrines of law.
This chapter undertakes an analysis of the recent 
liberal trends inherent in this judicial balancing 
process. To facilitate the accomplishment of this task, 
a two step approach is used. First, a discussion of 
the most often used justifications for extended account­
ants' liability Is presented. This discussion Is struc­
tured to reveal both the legal and extra-legal signifi­
cance of each argument. Second, a discussion of the 
major effects of such a liability extension is presented. 
This discussion is structured to reveal the impact which 
such a liability extension would have on society and 
the accounting profession. Such a two step approach 
provides a sound basis upon which a unified concept
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of the public accountants' third party legal liability 
may be built.
Justifications for Extended Liability 
In 1931, Justice Cardozo could find no significant 
reason to impose upon negligent public accountants lia­
bility for the injuries suffered by third party financial 
statement users. Since Cardozo first espoused this 
lack of justification, however, the courts have generally 
followed a path which has continually led to greater 
third party liability for the public accounting profession. 
These more liberal courts have usually relied upon three 
justifications for their movement toward the imposition 
of a greater degree of liability. First, the courts 
have agreed that public accounting is a "skilled profes­
sion". Therefore, some authorities argue that accountants 
should assume a degree of legal responsibility concomi­
tant to this professional status. Second, the courts 
have reasoned that third parties are forced to rely 
upon the public accountants' examination as their major 
verification of financial information. Therefore, many 
authorities have argued that the public accountant owes 
a duty of due care to the third party statement user. 
Finally, the courts have reasoned that the pursuit of 
legal -equity would require the judiciary to extend a 
helping hand to the innocent, but injured, third party. 
Therefore, legal authorities have argued that the 
public accountant, and not the third party, should bear
the burden of the accountant’s misrepresentation. A 
further analysis of each of these justifications follows.
Accounting as a Skilled Profession
Members of the accounting profession have always 
sought to convey to the public an image equivalent to 
that of the skilled professions of medicine and law.-*- 
While for many years, the profession was burdened with 
the public image of the green visored bookkeeper, today 
the extensive reliance placed on the financial state­
ments and opinion prepared by the certified public account
ant has elevated accounting to that desired position of
0professional status. The independent auditor is now 
viewed by society as an expert at his calling, an indi­
vidual who possesses skills above and beyond those of 
the ordinary man.3
This professional status to which the public 
accountant has been elevated has brought with it three 
significant advantages. First, this rise to professional 
status has precipitated a significant increase in the 
fees received by public accountants. Second, this rise
•^Victor M. Earle, "The Litigation Explosion," 
Journal of Accountancy 129 (March, 1970):65.
^Richard L. Miller, "Public Accountants and 
Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party," Notre Dame
Lawyer 47 (Fall, 1972):605.-
3joseph P. Dawson, "Auditors’ Third Party Liability 
An Ill-Considered Extension of the Law," Washington Law 
Review 46 (1971)s679.
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to professional status has produced a concomitant rise 
in the prestige afforded public accountants by various 
segments of our society.** Finally, this rise to profes­
sional status has, for the most part, produced signifi­
cant legal advantages for public accountants.-5 These 
three specific advantages have had a tremendous impact 
upon both the public accounting profession and its 
members.
For the members of most professions, the advantages 
which are gained due to an increase in status are accom­
panied by an increase in certain of the profession's 
legal responsibilities. Professional men, in general, 
and all others who undertake a type of work which calls 
for the use of special skills, are required by the courts 
not only to exercise reasonable care in the performance 
of their service function, but also, are required to 
possess a minimum level of special skill and ability.^
If such a professional person professes to speak with 
knowledge on a particular subject about which he should 
know, or a subject about which he has a duty to know, 
that skilled professional should be held responsible 
for any damages suffered due to his failure to apply
^Shatterproof Glass Corporation v. James, 466 
S.W. 873 (Tex. App. 1971).
^William L. Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed. (St. 
Paul: West Publishing Company), p. 165.
^Ibid., p. 161.
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reasonable care In the making of his representation 
of that knowledge to others.7 if this professional 
duty of due care were universally applied by the courts, 
it would seem that such a duty would apply to the account­
ant-third party relationship. Yet, the courts have 
never attempted such a universal application.
Since the promulgation of the New York Rule, two 
forces have had a significant impact on the area of the 
professional’s legal liability to third parties. First, 
the legal liability of negligent professionals for the 
pecuniary losses of third parties has, in general,: 
increased steadily.  ̂ This increasing trend is due to 
the courts' acceptance of more liberal concepts of lia­
bility placement in most areas of the law of negligence. 
Second, the legal liability of public accountants to 
third party financial statement users has failed to 
keep pace with the other areas of professional negligence 
liability. This trend is due to the unwillingness of 
many courts to abandon the concept of privity of contract 
when dealing with the accountant-third party relationship. 
Thus, while the public accounting profession is eager 
to reap the benefits associated with professional status,
7e . S. Oakes, and G. S. Gullick, eds., American 
Jurisprudence (San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney Company,
19^0), vol. 23, sec. 127.
^Darrell D. Halleth and Thomas R. Collins, 
"Auditors' Responsibility for Misrepresentation:
Inadequate Protection for Users of Financial Statements," 
Washington Law Review 44 (1968):191.
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public accountants have not been forced to assume an 
equivalent amount of legal responsibility.9
If the public accounting profession is to maintain 
its public image, individual accountants must be willing 
to accept the responsibilities inherent in that image.
The certified public accountant should become a profes­
sional reporter.10 Therefore, he should accept, at 
least to some degree, liability to third parties for 
failure to exercise reasonable care in the performance 
of his public attest function.
The Third Party's Forced Reliance 
As far back as the thirties, there existed an 
extremely close relationship between the public account­
ant and the third party financial statement user.
Although this accountant-third party relationship was 
an extremely close one, it was generally agreed upon that 
the services of public accountants were primarily for 
the benefit of client corporations. Justice Cardozo 
had expressed the judiciary's agreement with this sentiment 
as early as 1931 (see chapter two). Today, the relation­
ship existent between the third party and the public
9r . W. V. Dickerson, "Accountants and the Law 
of Negligence," Financial Executive 31* (November, 1966):
8 .
1^John C. Burton, "An Educator Views the Public 
Accounting Profession," Journal of Accountancy 132 
(September, 1971) :50.
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accountant has grown even closer.11 No longer does 
the certified public accountant primarily serve his 
employer. Instead, the primary goal of the public account­
ant’s function is to provide an opinion as to the fairness 
with which a particular financial representation could 
be used by outsiders. In fact, the accountant-third 
party relationship has become so primary that if not 
for the demands of third party statement users, most 
publicly held corporations would not find the services of 
independent public accountants at all necessary.1^
This increase in the primacy of the accountant- 
third party relationship is directly related to an 
increase in the reliance placed on certified financial 
statements by third parties. There are four major reasons 
for this increase in the third party’s reliance on 
independently verified financial statements. First, 
third parties generally lack the expertise necessary for 
proper analysis of a particular entity's financial 
position. Second, third parties generally lack access 
to the information necessary for a complete financial 
analysis of any corporate entity. Third, both the third 
party and the corporate entity would soon find the cost 
of individual financial examinations to be highly
11Nicholas D. Tellie, "Auditor's Liability to 
Third Parties," Loyola Law Review 17 (1970-1971):357.
12Norman 0. Olson, "The Auditor in Legal Difficulty—  
What’s the Answer?," Journal of Accountancy 129 (April, 
1970):43.
100
prohibitive. Fourth, individual financial examinations 
would eventually place an unwarranted burden upon the 
record keeping operations of any particular business 
e n t i t y . T h e s e  four factors, when combined with the 
fact that the third party is seldom capable of choosing 
the public accountant upon whom he will rely,11* force 
the third party statement user to place blind faith in 
the opinion of any member of the public accounting pro­
fession.
This increased third party reliance has forced 
the accounting profession to operate in a more public 
sphere. This public sphere is governed by the laws of 
free competition, and as such, attempts to provide each 
entity with complete information in order to guarantee 
efficient and accurate allocations of scarce resources.
Any misstated financial information will result in resource 
misallocation and waste.^ Since the public is not 
expert at this process of information procurement and 
dissemination— and the certified public accountant is—  
the public is at the mercy of the professional accountant. 
Therefore, the old rules of law based upon the more or
13M^rts— Professional Negligence— Accountants 
may be Liable to Third Parties for Negligence,” Texas 
Law Review 50 (January, 1972):4l6-4l7.
■^Denzil y. Causey, Jr., "Foreseeability as a 
Determinant of Audit Responsibility,” The Accounting Review
47 (April, 1973):26l.
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less private relationship between the auditor and his 
employer must be abandoned.^ The trend toward the 
public watchdog function of accounting must continue.^
It would seem to be in the public interest for the 
courts to take a serious look at a possible extension of 
the accountant's public responsibilities.1®
The Lack of Legal Equity 
In 1931, the New York Court used what might be 
called some "novel" theories of tort liability place­
ment to protect the public accountant from a potentially 
ruinous third party legal liability. The result of the 
imposition of these novel theories of liability place­
ment was that in choosing between the injured third 
party statement user and the negligent accountant, the 
court concluded that the innocent third party should be 
forced to bear the burden of the pecuniary damages 
suffered due to the public accountant's financial mis­
representation (for justification see chapter two).1^
Prior to the establishment of this rule of tort 
liability placement, the courts had generally recognized
l6Tellie, p. 357-
^Thomas W. Hill, Jr., "The Public Accountants'
Legal Liability to Clients and Others," New York Certified 
Public Accountant 38 (January, 1968):28..
■^Olson, p. 39.
•^Texas Tunneling Company v. City of Chattanooga,
204 P. Supp 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1964), rev'd 329 F. 2d 402 
(6th Cir. 1964).
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that legal equity made it necessary to place the burden 
of any damages suffered due to the negligent manufacture 
of an Inherently dangerous object upon the maker of that 
particular object.2^ While this concept of negligence 
liability has been almost totally accepted by the courts 
when dealing with cases which involve negligence resulting 
in personal injury, the judiciary has not found this 
concept to be universally desirable when dealing with 
cases which involve public accountants, third party 
statement users and pecuniary damages.
This dichotomy in legal reasoning leaves a basic 
question unanswered. Is a negligently audited set of 
financial statements any less dangerous to a potential 
user than a negligently manufactured automobile? The 
first of these acts causes the potential loss of an 
individual’s financial resources, the second potentially 
causes the loss of the individual's ability to generate 
those resources.21 In a complex industrial society, 
the public accountant’s opinion as to the fairness of 
a particular financial representation can inflict upon 
a statement user damage more potent than any injury 
which can be inflicted by a particular manufacturer's 
tools.^2 While the lack of any distinction between the
^°MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N.Y. 382 
(1916).
21Miller, p. 605..
^United States v. Benjamin, 328 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir.
1964).
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consequences of these acts seems quite apparent, the 
courts have, for some reason, found a discernable distinc­
tion existent. This difference, and its repeated judicial 
application, have produced a significant impairment of 
the legal equity inherent to the system.
An extension of the third party civil liability 
of certified public accountants would enhance the equitable 
nature of the judicial system in three ways. First, by 
forcing the members of the public accounting profession 
to assume the financial burden created by their mistakes—  
a financial burden which would almost certainly be passed 
on to the general consuming public in the form of higher 
audit prices— the legal system would provide for an 
equitable distribution of that financial burden over the 
whole of society instead of causing the manifestation 
of the injury to be limited to one particular financial 
statement user.23 Second, by forcing the members of the 
public accounting profession to assume the financial 
burden created by their mistakes, the legal system would 
shift the impact of the financial loss from the party
who only relies upon the financial misrepresentation to
ohthe party who actually created that misrepresentation. 
Third, by forcing the members of the public accounting 
profession to assume the financial burden created by their
23Rusch Factors, Incorporated v. Levin, 284 F. Supp.
85 (R.I. 1968).
2^Earle, p. 67 .
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mistakes, the legal system would create a great deal of 
judicial balance between tort liability for personal, 
property and pecuniary damage.25 Thus, it would seem 
that an increase in the public accountant's civil lia­
bility to thrid party financial statement users would 
enhance the equity inherent in the existent system of 
law.
Legal authorities, and many courts, have reasoned 
that a certified public accountant should, at least to 
some extent, be responsible to third party financial 
statement users for misrepresentations which cause 
pecuniary loss. The fact that public accountants are 
members of a skilled profession, the fact that the general 
public is provided with no alternative other than to rely 
on the representations of members of that profession, 
and the fact that the current legal system fails to 
achieve a state of equity, all contribute to the case for 
extending the accountant's civil liability. Yet, any law 
of accountants' liability must, by necessity, result from 
the application of a careful balancing process. The 
remainder of this chapter discusses the factors inherent 
in the other half of that process.
Effects of Extended Liability 
The second half of that judicial balancing process 
consists of weighing the effects that an extension of the
2^Mlller, p. 605.
accountant’s civil liability would have upon the public 
accounting profession, and potentially, the rest of 
economic society. In general, it has been argued that 
there would be three major effects caused by an extension 
of the legal responsibilities of members of the public 
accounting profession. First, an increase in the legal 
responsibilities of public accountants might foster the 
development of better accounting principles, procedures and 
practices. Second, an increase in the legal responsi­
bilities of public accountants might seriously affect 
the cost and availability of malpractice insurance.
Finally, an increase in the legal responsibilities of 
public accountants might create a serious economic 
threat to the entire accounting profession. The remainder 
of this chapter seeks to analyze each of these potential 
effects.
The Effect on Accounting Services 
Contrary to the arguments which have been advanced 
by several writers, a liberalization of the legal concepts 
which presently govern the accountant-third party rela­
tionship would not necessarily leave the certified public 
accountant without adequate protection from third party 
litigation. Even if all courts were to universally 
accept such an extension of the public accountant’s 
legal responsibilities, the Individual accountant could 
be held responsible to third party statement users only 
for pure fraud, failure to act in good faith or a failure
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to exercise due care in the performance of the attest 
function. In other words, the accountant must, at least 
to some extent, be guilty of some degree of fault if 
third party liability is to be imposed by the judiciary.
It would seem that the proficient public account­
ant (i.e., the public accountant who applies the standards 
which have been established by the profession in a careful 
and accurate manner) would be able to rely upon the 
principles and procedures of the accounting profession 
as a prime mechanism for avoiding an expanded third 
party legal liability. Yet, it would further seem, that 
the threat of this potential legal liability would 
constitute a positive force for professional action.
This threat of third party litigation would provide an 
incentive for the profession, and its members, to take 
action to insure the avoidance of such liability.
These positive professional actions would take 
several forms. First, the potential for increased 
liability would force the public accountant, and the 
profession in general, to take steps to improve the 
results of the audit process. An increase in the scope of 
many audits, an increase in the independent auditor's 
personal adherence to generally accepted auditing standards 
and an increase in the general level of those standards
p R. James Gormley, "Accountants' Professional 
Liability— A Ten Year Review," Business Lawyer 29 (July, 
1974):1206.
would probably be an Inherent part of the process of 
upgrading the auditor's attest function.2? Second, 
a potentially greater legal responsibility to third 
parties would force the accountant to become more aware 
of the existence of the primary user of his financial 
representations— the third party. No longer would 
the public accountant be able to satisfy his legal 
responsibilities by providing information adequate to 
meet his client's needs. Instead, the certified public 
accountant will have to supplant this old client 
orientation with a new form of user orientation.28 
Third, an increase in the legal responsibilities of public 
accountants would tend to push substandard accountants 
away from certain engagements. Engagements which 
involve potentially great amounts of liability would 
be handled by those accountants most able to deal with 
the specific problems which might arise. Finally, 
the acceptance of a legal doctrine which would hold 
the accountant liable to a greater extent would defi­
nitely lead to an increase in the use of cautionary 
devices. All members of the profession would approach 
each engagement with a great deal more care and caution.2^





Thus, an upgrading of professional services seems to 
represent at least one major advantage of an extension 
of the public accountant’s third party responsibility.
The Effect on Malpractice Insurance
Although it is highly probable that an extension 
of the public accountant’s legal liability will produce 
certain beneficial effects, most recent writers have 
concentrated on the fact that such an extension of 
legal responsibility will create certain major dis­
advantages for both the accounting profession and economic 
society. One of these major disadvantages lies in the 
effect that increased legal liability would have upon 
the institution of accountants’ malpractice insurance.
As the potential for legal liability for injury 
suffered by third party financial statement users has 
become an integral part of the accountant's audit function, 
more and more members of the profession have turned to 
malpractice insurance as a means of obtaining protection 
from judgments arising out of third party litigation.
Yet, most accountants, and many insurance underwriters, 
have expressed the opinion that an increase in the third 
party responsibility of the public accounting profession 
would both create upward pressure on the price of such 
insurance protection, and force underwriters to limit 
the number of firms to which such protection could be
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offered.30 For these reasons, accountants fear that 
adequate Insurance will not be available to protect 
them from the economic effects which would result from 
an increase in third party liability.
While the cost of adequate malpractice insurance 
coverage would almost certainly rise as the courts extend 
the legal responsibilities of the public accounting 
profession, the prudent public accountant would be capable 
of taking appropriate steps to prevent this sudden 
increase in insurance cost from seriously damaging his 
practice. One available mechanism for dealing with the 
problem of increased insurance premiums is that of 
including a deductible provision in the policy. As 
early as 1970, insurance companies were offering this 
type of policy to members of the accounting profession.
One such policy was then based on a sliding scale which 
presented accountants with the opportunity to gain any­
where from a seven percent reduction in the premium for 
assuming a $250 deductible to a thirty percent reduction 
for assuming a $10,000 deductible.31 Thus, by acting 
as a self-insurer for a portion of any legal liability,
3°See Constantine N. Katsoris, "Measures to Reduce 
Accountants' Public Liability Exposure," New York Certified 
Public Accountant 40 (January, 1970):36; and Miller, p.Sot;
3!Arthur J. Francia and Norman J. Elliot, "Signi­
ficant Differences in Accountants' Professional Liability 
Coverage," New York Certified Public Accountant 40 
(October, 1970):6ll.
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the accountant can significantly reduce the burden of 
the Increased Insurance costs which would result from 
extended third party civil liability.
Beyond affecting the cost of malpractice insurance, 
an extension of the public accountant’s legal responsi­
bilities would also significantly affect the availability 
of that insurance. In fact, there is a great deal of 
justifiable doubt as to whether the private sector could 
continue any such policies in the face of such a liability 
extension. With no experience under the legal conditions 
which would be prevalent, the private insurance under­
writers would find it impossible to immediately determine 
a sound rate structure.32 Therefore, most companies would, 
at least temporarily, withdraw their policies from the 
market. Yet, again, if the profession reacts to this 
problem in a prudent and rational manner, the situation 
will not have a serious impact upon the practice of 
public accounting. As a primary action, the profession 
could develop its own malpractice coverage to reduce 
the negative economic effect of increased liability.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
and some state societies have already taken this type of 
action. Such action is designed to guarantee members
32Leonard Mentzer, "Accountants' Common Law 
Liability to Third Persons for Misrepresentation," 
California Law Review 57 (1969):287.
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some type of malpractice insurance coverage.33 if 
this type of professional action is capable of providing 
individual accountants with a basic amount of temporary 
protection, private sector insurance companies will 
soon fill any gap which might remain. As the new legal 
doctrines become more clear, claim patterns will tend 
to stabilize and private insurers will again be in a 
position to offer the accountant adequate malpractice 
insurance.3^. Thus, in the long run, adequate insurance 
coverage will always be available to members of the public 
accounting profession.35
Although problems in the areas of cost and avail­
ability of malpractice insurance coverage represent 
significant drawbacks to any extension of the public 
accountant’s legal liability, proper action on the part 
of the profession could mitigate the effects of such 
problems. Thus, it would seem that the balancing 
process still weighs in favor of an increase in the 
third party civil liability of the public accounting 
profession.
33Richard S.. Helstein, "Guidelines for Professional 
Liability Insurance Coverage," Certified Public Accountant 




The Economic Effect on Public Accounting
While many members of the public accounting pro­
fession do fear the effect that increased legal respon­
sibility will have upon the institution of malpractice 
insurance, the profession’s greatest fear takes the form 
of the indeterminate economic liability which Cardozo 
had sought to avoid more than forty years ago. Today, 
accountants have reiterated Cardozo's economic fear in 
a variety of forms. First, the accounting profession 
has continually argued that a liberalization of the 
concepts presently governing the accountant-third party 
relationship will create a tremendous economic burden 
in the form of court imposed settlements.36 Second, 
certain members of the accounting profession have argued 
that increased legal responsibilities will eventually 
force smaller public accounting firms to redirect their 
efforts away from areas of potentially large liability 
settlements. This redirection of efforts, it is argued, 
will eventually result in a shortage of certain types 
of accounting s e r v i c e s . 37 Third, most public accounting 
firms have argued that an increase in legal responsibility 
will eventually produce an increase in the cost, and thus 
the price, of audit services.3® Although each of these
3^Thomas F. Rogers, "Accounting— Is Liability for 
Ordinary Negligence Just Around the Corner?," Boston 




lines of argumentation has some basic degree of merit, 
a further examination will reveal that the relative 
significance of each is somewhat questionable.
The primary fear of most public accountants, and 
the factor which motivated Cardozo, is that the imposi­
tion of extended legal responsibility will eventually 
result in the financial ruin of the entire profession 
of public accounting. While the factors inherent in 
the realization of this fear may have been significant 
enough to warrant a liability limiting decision in 1931> 
the economic circumstances which surround the activities 
of public accountants today give rise to questions as 
to the present validity of that decision. In the early 
thirties, it was estimated that the gross income of all 
individuals and firms involved in the practice of public 
accounting was $60 million.39 At that same time, the 
average market value of the stock issued by a New York 
Stock Exchange Company (a measure of the maximum potential 
third party liability of public accountants) was below 
$59 million.1*0 Yet, by the early seventies, these 
relationships had changed significantly. While the 
average market value of a New York Stock Exchange 
Corporation's stock had risen to a level slightly less
^ " C e r t i f i e d  Public Accountants," Fortune 5 
(June, 1932):95-
**°See Thomas T. Murphy , ed., The New. York Stock 
Exchange ‘197*1 Fact Book (New York: New York Stock
Exchange, 197*0 •
than ten times that existent in 1930, ̂  the gross 
income of persons and firms involved in public accounting 
rose to a level at least fifty times as great as that in 
the earlier period. In 197^> one public accounting firm, 
Arthur Andersen and Company, reported gross income of 
more than $200 m i l l i o n . I t  would therefore seem that 
the potential of the public accounting profession to 
withstand the economic effects of extended liability 
has increased substantially over the last forty years. 
Yet, even beyond this basic change in the economic 
situation, there has been a second occurrence which 
today protects members of the accounting profession from 
the financial ruin which might result from third party 
litigation. Today, unlike the period of the thirties, 
most accounting firms carry some form of professional 
malpractice insurance. This insurance coverage provides 
accountants with at least partial compensation for any 
losses which are incurred due to court imposed legal 
settlements. Thus, the economic growth of the profession 
and the development of professional malpractice insurance 
coverage serve to reduce the chances of court imposed 
financial disaster for the public accountant.
As the public accountant's legal liability to 
third party financial statement users increases, some
^1Ibid.
^2See Arthur Andersen and Company, Annual Report of 
Arthur Andersen and Company (Chicago: Arthur Andersen
and Company, 197^)*
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of the smaller members of the industry may find it desirable 
to reorient their service functions away from areas of 
potentially high third party involvement. Certain 
members of the profession have recently argued that 
this redirection of efforts on the part of small firms may 
create a shortage of available audit services for publicly 
held corporations.^3 Yet, a further analysis, again, 
reveals the lack of significance of this line of argumenta­
tion. At present the "big eight" accounting firms handle 
approximately eighty percent of all audits conducted on 
publicly held clients.^ Surely, an increase in the 
efforts of these major firms, combined with the general 
efforts of the large regional firms, would guarantee 
the existence of adequate services to meet the needs of 
both new and old publicly held corporations.
Since an extension of the public accountant's 
third party legal responsibilities would create a need 
to increase the scope of some audit examinations, cause 
the profession to incorporate an increased number of 
cautionary techniques into the audit function and place 
increased upward pressure on the cost of professional
^Since publicly held corporations represent the 
area of greatest relationship between the public account­
ant and the third party financial statement user, members 
of the profession fear that many of the smaller account­
ing firms will avoid such a great amount of contact with 
potential third party litigants by avoiding engagements 
which involve these publicly held corporations.
**̂ Arthur M. Louis, "The Accountants are Changing 
the Rules," Fortune 77 (June 15, 1968):178.
malpractice insurance coverage, members of the profession 
would soon feel the need to increase the price of an 
audit examination. Accountants have recently argued 
that such an increase in audit costs would first, force 
smaller clients to abandon the use of independent financial 
verifications, and second, cuase many small accounting 
firms to lose their ability to compete for the available 
client market. Yet, again, there are several factors 
which significantly reduce the weight of these arguments. 
First, a combination of Securities and Exchange Commission 
Requirements and the need for certified financial state­
ments as a prerequisite to the consummation of many 
types of business transactions would force most business 
entities to maintain their present policy toward the 
engagement of public accountants for audit purposes.
Second, since increased liability will potentially affect 
all firms equally, no particular accounting firm should 
be able to gain a competitive edge in terms of prices 
without incurring a reduction in profits, or an increase 
in financial risks. Thus, it would seem that while an 
increase in audit costs would be most certainly passed 
on to clients, these increased costs would not have a 
significant effect on the public accounting profession 
or its members.
While larger court imposed settlements, a redirection 
of the efforts of some smaller accounting firms and an 
increase in audit service costs would result from increased
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legal liability, the profession can, and most probably 
would, take action to negate the disadvantageous nature 
of these economic effects. Since these economic effects, 
and the effects on the institution of malpractice insurance, 
can be significantly reduced, and since an increase in 
legal liability would produce better accounting practices, 
it would seem that the balancing process weighs, at least 
in terms of professional and societal effects, in favor 
of an increase in the public accountant's legal respon­
sibilities to third party financial statement users.
Summary
After performing the balancing process which is 
applied to the area of accountants' liability, two 
conclusions may be drawn. First, there are significant 
legal reasons for extending the accountant's third party 
responsibilities beyond their present limits. Second, 
while there were, in 1930, significant extra-legal 
reasons for not obeying the dictates of legal precedent, 
these same extra-legal reasons do not exist, or can be 
significantly militated, today. Therefore, public 
accountants should be held responsible to third party 
financial statement users. Chapter five attempts to 
present a unified legal doctrine which could be used by 
the courts to apply the results of this legal balancing 
process.
CHAPTER V
A PROPOSED CONCEPT OP ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY
With the basic process of balancing justifica­
tions and effects completed, it becomes possible to 
progress beyond the underlying analysis of situations 
and reasoning, to the development of a basic set of 
legal principles which can be applied by the courts as 
a means of regulating the relationship which exists 
between the public accountant and the third party 
financial statement user. At this point, two generaliza­
tions concerning such a legal concept may be advanced. 
First, any such set of judicial doctrines must be designed 
in a manner which will provide the third party statement 
user with at least a minimum degree of legal recourse 
to members of the public accounting profession. Unless 
provided with such a means of recovery, the third party 
will continue to bear the financial burden of the 
certified public accountant's mistakes. Second, any 
such set of judicial doctrines must be based upon a 
legal concept which can be consistently and equitably 
applied by the courts, while also being easily understood 
by members of both the public accounting profession and
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the general investing public.1 Without this degree of 
consistency and predictability the courts, third parties 
and the public accounting profession would soon find 
a legal situation similar to the confusing state of the 
law which confronts them today.
This chapter attempts to formulate a workable 
legal concept through the use of a two step approach.
The first section of this chapter presents a proposed 
concept which could be used to determine the professional 
responsibilities of certified public accountants. This 
section centers on selecting a method of responsibility 
determination which could eventually bring the legal 
and professional interpretations of the accountant’s 
audit responsibilities into greater harmony. The second 
section of this chapter attempts to delineate a doctrine 
of liability placement which could be used in all instances 
of accountant-third party litigation. This section 
concentrates on defining the relationship and degree of 
fault which should be considered necessary to justify 
third party recovery. Such a two step approach provides 
the basis of a solution to the perplexing problems 
which currently surround the accountant-third party 
legal relationship.
■^Henry B. Reiling and Russel A. Taussig, "Recent 
Liability Cases— Implications for Accountants," Journal 
of Accountancy 130 (September, 1970):47.
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The Determination of Professional 
Responsibility
It was initially decided by the judiciary that 
there was no justification for the imposition of court 
espoused, uneducated, standards of conduct upon members 
of the recognized "skilled professions". In an effort 
to Implement such a philosophy of responsibility determina­
tion, the courts, in general, sought to allow members 
of those professions, and their authorized regulatory 
agencies, to promulgate the rules of professional conduct 
which would be adhered to by persons practicing those 
particular skills. This degree of conformity between 
the judicial and professional interpretations of the 
standards of professional conduct contributed greatly 
to the continued growth and prosperity of the public 
accounting profession.
Unfortunately for the public accounting profession, 
several recent courts have seen fit to circumvent this 
generally accepted rule of legal conduct, and in so doing, 
have imposed upon certain public accountants legal respon­
sibilities above and beyond those which had been previously 
established by the profession. While these clashes 
between the standards established by the courts and those 
established by public accounting have, so far, been 
limited to the areas of disclosure of subsequent event, 
detection of the existence of fraudulent activity, 
preparation of unaudited financial statements and dis­
closure of current value financial information, most
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authorities have expressed the belief that any further 
infringement by the courts upon the standards of public 
accounting will further contribute to an attitude of 
overconservatism which is currently embraced by many 
members of the profession. This attitude of overconserva­
tism can seriously stultify the accounting profession 
in its attempts to keep pace with the information needs 
of economic society (see chapter three).
A specific concept of professional responsibility 
determination must be developed in order to close the 
gap which presently plagues the judiciary, third parties 
and public accountants. Such a legal concept must 
necessarily include three basic parts. First, such a 
concept of professional responsibility determination 
must provide for a uniform method of developing the legal 
and professional standards by which a public accountant 
will be judged. Second, such a legal concept must 
include a method by which the specific activities of 
an Individual accountant may be compared with the standards 
established for the profession as a whole. Finally, such 
a concept of responsibility determination must include 
a clear statement of the limited conditions under which 
it would be acceptable for a public accountant’s actions 
to fall short of the generally accepted legal and pro­
fessional standards. A discussion of some proposed 
ideas for each of these basic concepts of accountants' 
third party liability follows.
Although the members of the public accounting 
profession were initially free to establish the standards 
which would be used to judge the reasonableness of an 
individual accountant's audit activities, the courts 
have recently begun to create inroads into this once 
basic right of all skilled professionals. Yet, if public 
accounting is to continue to adequately serve the Investing 
public, the courts must discontinue this policy of 
judicial infringement. The conduct of professional 
accountants must be regulated by, and judged in accordance 
with, standards which have been researched and developed 
by knowledgeable groups of individuals. While It is 
proper for the courts to espouse broad guidelines and 
possible goals for the accounting profession, the process 
of promulgating specific accounting standards must be 
left to the persons most capable of developing those 
specific standards— public accountants.2 Unless the 
courts again grant to the accounting profession the right 
which has been universally extended to all other skilled 
professionals— the right to develop their own standards 
of professional conduct and responsibility— the accounting 
profession, and therefore, all of economic society, 
will continue to be burdened with professional standards
2Michael J. Whaling, "Liability of Certified Public 
Accountants— Unaudited Financial Statements-— Certified 
Public Accountants are Liable for Negligence in Preparation 
of Unaudited Statements," Notre Dame Lawyer 48 (December, 
1972):498-499.
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which have been promulgated by members of the judiciary 
who are uneducated in the intricacies of accounting 
practice.
Yet, the fact that public accountants should be 
allowed to establish the standards of professional 
conduct by which they will ultimately be judged does 
not mean that each individual accountant should be 
totally free to establish standards of professional con­
duct for each particular audit examination. If any­
thing, the public accountant should be barred from using 
professional standards as a means of avoiding liability.
The certified public accountant, above all, should 
be precluded from using general compliance with a 
set of isolated professional standards as a means of 
universally avoiding liability.3 Instead, the activities 
of members of the public accounting profession must be 
judged in relation to the entire set of standards of 
professional conduct and the way those standards relate 
to the particular audit situation. To accomplish this 
task, the courts must continue to use the concept of 
the "reasonably prudent man" as a basis for comparing 
the activities of the individual accountant to those 
which would be required by the profession’s standards 
of conduct. This reasonably prudent public accountant
3Theodore Sonde, "The Responsibility of Professionals 
Under the Federal Securities Laws— Some Observations," 
Northwestern University Law Review 68 (March-April,
1 9 7 3 M .
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possesses the professional skills of the normal practicing 
accountant. Yet, unlike the normal practicing accountant, 
the reasonably prudent accountant never is guilty of 
performing an unreasonable act. This accountant, in 
theory, reacts to all fact situations in a reasonable 
and prudent manner, and therefore, performs his audit 
function in a manner which has been determined by his 
profession, and economic society, to be acceptable.^
If the courts continue to apply the concept of the reason­
able man to eases involving accountants and third party 
financial statement users, economic society can be sure 
that accounting standards will serve as guides to accept­
able professional conduct, and not arbitrary rules for 
the avoidance of civil liability.
If the courts were willing to allow the public 
accounting profession to establish its own standards 
of conduct, and if the courts were to continue to use 
the concept of the reasonable man in determining whether 
an individual public accountant had performed his audit 
in accordance with those professional standards, the 
problem of closing the gap between the professional and 
legal interpretations of the accountant’s responsibilities 
would be reduced significantly, but not yet completely 
solved. There would still exist certain situations in 
which an individual public accountant would find it
^William L. Prosser, Lavr of Torts, 4th ed. (St. 
Paul: West Publishing Company, 1971)» P • 151.
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impossible to comply with the profession’s established 
standards of conduct. Traditionally, such a situation 
has caused the public accountant to add a disclaimer, 
or qualification, to his audit opinion. While this 
method of informing the statement using public of the 
accountant’s inability to conduct an adequate audit did 
initially fulfill its purpose, some accountants have, 
and most probably will, use one of these two mechanisms 
as a means of avoiding their inherent legal responsi­
bilities. 5 The courts must take two steps to preclude 
the accountant from relying upon disclaimers and qualifica­
tions as a mode of liability avoidance. First, the courts 
should refuse to recognize the validity of any overly 
broad disclaimers or qualifications of opinions.  ̂ By 
taking this first step, the courts would bar members 
of the accounting profession from using general disclaimers 
or qualifications as a means of precluding third party 
litigation. Second, the courts should require the public 
accountant to state the specific reasons for any valid 
disclaimer or qualification which is issued. Such a 
step would provide for third party financial statement 
users information regarding the circumstances which
^See Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W. 2d 395 (Iowa 1969); 
and Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Swartz, 
Bresenoff, Yavner and Jacobs, 455 F. 2d 847 (4th Cir.
1972).
^"Torts— Professional Negligence— Accountants may 
be Liable to Third Parties for Negligence," Texas Law 
Review 50 (January, 1972):417.
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resulted In the accountant’s inability to conduct an 
adequate audit examination. These two mechanisms would 
allow the public accountant a means of avoiding liability 
in certain uncontrollable situations, provide the third 
party with information concerning the specifics of these 
situations and prevent the public accountant from using 
the disclaimer or qualification as a universal means of 
liability avoidance.
It would therefore seem that three steps are 
necessary if the gap between the professional and legal 
interpretations of the public accountant’s responsibilities 
Is to be narrowed. Firsts the courts should again allow 
knowledgeable members of the accounting profession 
to establish the standards of conduct by which individual 
public accountants must abide. Second, the courts 
must continue to use the concept of the reasonable man 
in comparing the activities undertaken by an individual 
accountant to those activities required by professional 
standards and the individual fact situation. Finally, 
the courts must reject overly broad disclaimers and 
qualifications of the professional accountant’s opinion. 
This three step approach to responsibility determination 
should have a significant, and advantageous, effect on 
the legal situation which currently plagues the accounting 
profession, the courts and third party financial state­
ment users.
127
The Placement of Civil Liability 
At several points in time, different members of 
the judiciary have advanced at least six separate 
doctrines of civil liability placement -which are applicable 
to cases involving certified public accountants and third 
party financial statement users. Today, a particular 
court could possibly choose any of these concepts in 
determining the civil liability of a specific accountant 
to a specific third party statement user. This multi­
plicity of available legal doctrines has created substantial 
problems for both the courts and the accounting profession. 
In outlining any solution to this problem of liability 
placement, a two step approach must be taken. First, 
a doctrine of liability placement must be selected 
to deal with situations in which the certified public 
accountant is guilty of pure fraud. Second, a concept 
of liability placement must be selected to deal with 
situations in which the certified public accountant 
is guilty of something less the pure fraud (i.e., 
some form of negligence or gross negligence). If the 
courts were to take such an approach to the problem of 
liability placement, much of the uncertainty which is 
currently inherent in the law of accountants’ third 
party liability would be eliminated.
Liability Placement in Cases of Pure Fraud 
The earliest doctrine of liability placement 
which was applied by the courts to the accountant-third
party relationship was that of legal liability for 
pure fraud or deceit. Under such a concept of liability 
placements the public accountant would be held respon­
sible for the pecuniary losses suffered by third party 
financial statement users if that particular third party 
could prove the existence of three prerequisite conditions. 
To prove that the accountant is guilty of pure fraud, 
the third party must first prove the existence of 
scienter; that is, the third party must be able to prove 
that the public accountant knew that his financial 
representation was false or misleading. Beyond this 
basic proof of scienter, the third party must also prove 
the existence of intent on the part of the public 
accountant. In proving the existence of this element 
of intent, the third party need not prove that the public 
accountant specifically sought to deceive him, but 
instead, need only prove that the accountant realized 
that the class of persons to which the third party 
belonged would be influenced by his financial misrepre­
sentation. Finally, the third party has an obligation 
to prove that his reliance was justified. To accomplish 
this task the third party must prove that the fact upon 
which he relied was significantly misleading, and yet, 
not so misleading as to be obviously false to an 
individual possessed of reasonable skill and knowledge 
(see chapters two and three). This basic concept of
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liability for pure fraud was to be the first, and possibly 
only, concept of liability placement which was universally 
accepted by the courts.
While this threefold concept of legal liability 
for pure fraud should be retained by the courts, the 
courts must, for several reasons, progress beyond this 
initial doctrine if an equitable solution to the problem 
of accountants’ civil liability placement is to be 
developed. First, the concept of third party liability 
for pure fraud is much too limited to represent a complete 
answer to the existing problems. The courts’ require­
ments of the existence of scienter, intent and justifiable 
reliance preclude the imposition of civil liability in 
the vast majority of cases where the public accountant 
neither knows that his representation is misleading, nor 
intends the falsity of that representation to cause a 
third party to suffer financial injury.7 Second, some 
of the recent liberalizations which the courts have 
introduced into the law of fraud have added great amounts 
of confusion to the area of accountants' civil liability. 
The use of such concepts as gross negligence (i.e., 
fraud without proof of scienter and/or intent) as an 
inference of fraud have often forced judges and juries to 
attempt to draw an almost nonexistent distinction 




liability to third party financial statement users 
must continue to be imposed by the courts in cases 
involving pure fraud, the courts should abandon their 
attempts at expanding the fraud doctrines, and instead, 
progress to a more liberal concept of liability place­
ment in situations where the failings of the public 
accountant are not sufficient to warrant a charge of 
pure fraud.
Liability Placement in Cases of Negligence
As the courts attempted to define the principles 
which would eventually limit the public accountant’s 
liability for misrepresentations which were the result 
of faulty, yet not fraudulent, performances of the audit 
function, five doctrines of civil liability placement 
were developed (see chapter three). The earliest of 
these doctrines of liability placement consisted of the 
use of privity of contract as a bar to virtually all 
third party litigation. This privity rule was so strict 
as to almost totally eliminate third party recovery 
in situations where the accountant was guilty of an 
act less serious than fraud.
The first liberalization of the law of accountants' 
liability came when the courts allowed third parties 
to assert gross negligence as an inference of fraud.
Yet, as has already been stated, the gross negligence 
rule was both too restrictive and too confusing for 
equitable judicial application. As the courts became
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more liberal In their appraoch to accountants' civil lia­
bility, the primary benefit rule was used as a basic 
doctrine of liability placement. Although this rule did 
provide third parties with a means of recovering damages 
from a negligent accountant, the requirement that the 
third party be specifically known to the accountant prior 
to the performance of the audit function placed a much too 
restrictive interpretation on this law of negligence.^
The most liberal step which has actually been taken by the 
common law courts in dealing with the accountant-third 
party relationship consists of the use of the foreseen 
class rule to determine the accountant's liability for 
ordinary negligence. Again, this doctrine of liability 
placement does not provide an adequate answer to the prob­
lems presently confronting third party statement users.
The foreseen class rule would tend to protect powerful and 
sophisticated statement users who are capable of making 
sure that the auditor is aware that they are relying upon 
the financial representation.10 Thus, such a concept of 
liability placement would necessarily exclude the vast 
group of third party financial statement users whose reli­
ance cannot be specifically foreseen by the accountant.H
9lbid., p. 418.
1(̂R. James Gormley, "Accountants' Professional 
Liability— A Ten Year Review," Business Lawyer 29 (July, 
1974):1212.
■^David B. Isbell and D. R. Carmichael, "Dis­
claimers and Liability— The Rhode Island Trust Case," 
Journal of Accountancy 135 (April, 1973).'41.
While it is quite clear that the public accountant 
must, at least to some extent, be held responsible for 
injuries suffered by third parties due to negligently 
prepared financial statements, none of the doctrines 
of liability placement which has been previously espoused 
by the courts offers an adequate mechanism for determining 
the scope of that liability. It would therefore seem 
that the most equitable approach to the situation must 
come from a doctrine beyond those which have already 
been developed by the courts. The concept of legal 
liability for negligent misrepresentation to all fore­
seeable persons provides such a doctrine. Under such 
a concept of liability placement, the negligent public 
accountant would be held legally responsible for the 
injuries suffered by all persons, or groups of persons, 
who he should have reasonably foreseen as users of the 
financial statements which he prepared. In the course of 
a normal audit, the accountant would be potentially 
liable to all present and future investors and creditors 
that would be normally expected to use the financial 
statements. Such a concept would substantially broaden 
the present scope of the public accountant's third party 
liability.
Yet, to say that the courts should hold the 
accountant liable for negligence to all foreseeable third 
parties is not to say that the accountant is legally 
responsible for the losses suffered by any of those third
parties. Several checks must be incorporated into the 
doctrine of foreseeability before it is applied by the 
courts. First, the concept of liability to all fore­
seeable third parties should not be used to grant recovery 
unless the accountant is truely negligent. The public 
accountant should be responsible for the losses of third 
party financial statement users only if it can be proven 
that the public accountant has failed to perform his 
audit function in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards. The processes undertaken by the 
specific public accountant must be compared to those 
which would have been undertaken by the reasonably prudent 
accountant in making the determination of the accountant's 
negligence. Second, the concept of liability to all 
foreseeable.third parties should not be used to grant 
recovery unless the public accountant has expressed an 
unqualified opinion as to the fairness of the financial 
presentation. If the certified public accountant has 
supplemented his opinion with a legally valid disclaimer 
or qualification, the third party financial statement 
user should be barred from recovery. Finally, and most 
importantly, the concept of liability to all foreseeable 
third parties should not be interpreted by the courts 
to represent absolute liability for negligence. The 
third party financial statement user must be required 
to prove that his reliance on the public accountant's 
misrepresentation was the proximate cause of the injury
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which he suffered.12 If the concept of liability to all 
foreseeable third parties is applied in a manner which 
incorporates these basic restrictions, the third party 
statement user and the public accountant will find the 
existence of a legal concept which guarantees adequate 
protection from misrepresentation for the third party 
and legal stability for the accounting profession.
In determining the scope of the public accountant's 
third party liability the courts have had several doctrines 
from which to choose. Yet, if an equitable and noncon­
fusing legal situation is to be arrived at, the courts 
must take two firm legal steps. First, the courts 
must hold the accountant liable to third partiefe when 
that accountant is guilty of pure fraud. The courts 
must consider intent, scienter and reliance to be indis- 
pensible elements of this fraud doctrine. Second, the 
courts must hold the accountant liable to all foreseeable 
third parties when that accountant is guilty of negligence 
in the performance of the audit function. A violation of 
accounting standards, an unqualified audit opinion and 
reliance on the part of the third party must be considered 
prerequisite elements of this form of recovery. If 
these concepts are employed universally by the courts, an 
equitable and determinate concept of liability placement 
shall be produced.
12R1chard L. Miller, "Public Accountants and Attor­




The legal problems currently facing the public 
accounting profession are twofold in nature, and there­
fore, must be approached from many different points of 
orientation. This chapter has proposed several concepts 
which could serve as the basis of a workable doctrine 
of accountants' liability. First, the courts must allow 
the accounting profession to establish the standards of 
conduct by which its members will be judged. Second, 
the courts should employ the concept of the reasonable 
man in comparing the function performed by an individual 
accountant to that required by professional standards.
Third, the courts should reject overly general disclaimers 
and qualifications of the opinion advanced by the public 
accountant. Fourth, the courts must continue to hold 
public accountants liable to third parties when the account­
ant is guilty of pure fraud. Finally, the courts must 
begin to hold negligent accountants liable to all 
reasonably foreseeable third party statement users. This 
five step approach to accountants' civil liability both 
narrows the gap between the legal and professional 
interpretations of the accountant's duties and provides for 
an equitable and definitive distribution of the burden 
which results from financial misrepresentations.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The public accounting profession is today confronted 
with two legal problems of major significance. The first 
of these legal problems is the result of the judiciary’s 
recent infringement upon a set of rights which had tradi­
tionally been granted to the members of all skilled 
professions. This recent infringement has resulted in 
a judicial interpretation of the public accountant’s 
responsibilities which differs substantially from the 
interpretation which has been advanced by the public 
accounting profession. The second of these legal problems 
is the result of the judiciary's espousal of six distinct 
concepts of civil liability placement. The espousal 
of these six applicable doctrines has left the public 
accountant in the middle of a confusing, and often 
stultifying, situation. This dissertation has presented 
a five step approach toward analyzing and solving these 
legal problems.
Chapter two of this dissertation undertook to 
provide an historical perspective of the development of 
accountants' civil liability. It was found that the 
English Courts produced the first significant legal
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doctrines which were to be applied to the accountant- 
third party relationship. The American Courts were to 
later build upon these early concepts by proposing certain 
specific interpretations and applications of the British 
Doctrines. Yet, it was the New York Court, acting in 
the economically depressed thirties, that established 
the most lasting concept of accountants' third party 
liability. During the depression years, the New York 
Court sought to balance legal equity with social need, 
and in so doing, produced a restrictive concept of liability 
which was to be almost universally accepted by the courts 
for years to come.
As early legal doctrines began to intermingle with 
the complex societal and economic system of the sixties 
and seventies, a most perplexing situation began to develop. 
The first problem to confront the accounting profession 
resulted when the judiciary began to infringe upon the 
public accounting profession's right to establish the 
rules of conduct by which its members would be required 
to abide. This once universal right of all skilled 
professions was substantially reduced when the courts 
began to espouse standards of professional conduct with 
regard to the disclosure of subsequently acquired informa­
tion, the detection of corporate fraud, the preparation 
of unaudited financial statements and the disclosure 
of current value financial information. As the judiciary's 
infringement upon the rights of public accounting grew,
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the profession began to redirect its major efforts away 
from serving the economic sector and toward the avoidance 
of civil liability.
A second problem for the profession emerged in 
the form of a diverse set of doctrines of liability 
placement. As the modern courts reinterpreted and expanded 
the doctrines which had been developed by the early 
English and American Courts, the accountant found 
himself confronted with at least six distinct concepts 
of third party liability placement. In a given situation, 
a particular court could apply concepts of liability 
placement which ranged from a most conservative doctrine 
which was based upon a concept of pure fraud, to a most 
liberal doctrine which was based upon foreseeability 
and ordinary negligence. Thus, not only is the account­
ant today confronted with a discrepancy between legal 
and professional standards of conduct, but he is also 
confronted with a situation in which the determination 
of the scope of his liability is an almost impossible 
task.
Chapter four sought to analyze the balancing 
process through which a doctrine of accountants* liability 
could be developed. In so doing, this chapter sought 
to describe both the justifications for, and effects of 
an extension of the public accountant's third party lia­
bility. It was found that there were three legal justifi­
cations for an extension of the public accountant's civil
liability. First, it was argued that while the accounting 
profession has been eager to reap the benefits of the 
professional status which its members have achieved, 
public accountants have been unwilling to accept a 
concomitant degree of legal responsibility. Second, 
it was found that while the third party was virtually 
forced to rely upon the financial representations of 
public accountants, that third party had little legal 
recourse to an accountant who had performed his function 
improperly. Third, it was found that if the legal system 
is to treat all individuals in a fair and equitable 
manner, the accountant must assume a greater degree of 
third party liability. Thus, it would seem that there 
is substantial legal justification for an extension of 
the public accountant’s third party civil liability.
Beyond these basic legal justifications, chapter 
four sought to analyze the effects that an extension 
of the accountant's liability would have on both the 
profession and economic society. It was found that an 
extension of the public accountant’s third party liability 
would contribute to the quality of accounting services 
while not representing a significant threat to the 
economic stability of the accounting profession. There­
fore, chapter four concluded that there were significant 
reasons for extending the third party civil liability of 
public accountants beyond its present limits.
Chapter five sought to implement the conclusions 
drawn in chapter four while solving the basic problems 
which were discussed in chapter three. To accomplish this 
task a five step approach was taken. First, it was 
proposed that the public accounting profession be 
allowed to implement its own standards of professional 
conduct. Second, it was proposed that the courts continue 
to use the reasonable man as a basis for comparing the 
activities of an individual accountant to the standards 
of the profession as a whole. Third, it was proposed 
that the courts preclude accountants from using dis­
claimers and qualifications as a means of liability 
avoidance. Fourth, it was proposed that the courts 
continue to hold accountants liable to third parties 
when the accountants are guilty of pure fraud. Finally, 
it was proposed that the courts hold accountants liable 
to all reasonably foreseeable third parties when the 
accountants are guilty of any form of negligence. Such 
an approach to accountants’ third party liability would 
provide a more liberal concept of third party recovery 
while contributing to a sound system of law within which 
a solution to the problems confronting the accounting 
profession may be built.
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